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The world order is changing dramatically before our eyes. No longer do
prominent spokesmen warn that the revolutionary changes taking place in
the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe are indicative of a sophisticated scheme
of political maskirovka 1 , designed to dupe the West, nor do analysts expect a
rejuvenated form of detente, designed to secure victories in the international
arena of the Cold War. These notions were serious potential explanations of
the original "Gorbachev phenomenon" and were advanced by experts both
inside and outside government as recently as two years ago, during the period
when the greatest tangible symbol of Cold War hostility, the Berlin Wall,
passed into history. Today, these possibilities are merely historical footnotes
which muster no bureaucratic support or sponsorship. The question now
appears to be whether the Soviet Union can itself survive the era of glasnost
and perestroika, rather than if the West can survive a brilliantly crafted
diplomatic onslaught. This is one measure of how fundamentally the nature
of the policy debate has changed. The democratic revolution of 1989 and it's
attendant political, military, economic and cultural parameters have reshaped
the world as we have known it, redrawn the map and challenged nearly all
^Maskirovka is a fundamental concept of Soviet military art which describes the process
in which an enemy is presented with information and indicators which lead to an erroneous
interpretation of events (i.e. strategic deception). This process may very well include both
political and military component phases. For a more detailed explanation see Soviet Union,
Military Encyclopedic Dictionary. Volume V, (JPRS-UMA-86-010-L) 1986, p. 1774.
previous assumptions of international security structure. The changes are
undoubtedly real and they permeate every issue of international relations,
national strategic management, and politico-military strategic planning.
Strategic planners, if their products are to be relevant and useful in the 1990s,
must recognize that the world has undergone a dramatic revolution, not
merely an incremental evolution or short term aberration, regardless of the
ultimate destiny of the identity crisis currently wrenching the Soviet Union.
The dramatic changes in international security structure which have
occurred, without being spawned in the aftermath of epic warfare, are
unprecedented. The national strategic management and politico-military
planning processes are in a phase which is analogous (in magnitude if not
substance) to the era in which the post-World War II Containment Strategy
was born. This time, however, the challenge is more difficult—both
intellectually and practically—because the luxury of simply planning to
counter the designs of a universally distrusted and unpopular aggressor
nation is no longer viable. The new focus will undoubtedly be upon
questions concerning what the United States should actually be doing in the
world, rather than how it should prevent the Soviet Union from
accomplishing its international agenda. America is now clearly able to
assume a highly pro-active posture with respect to macro-level global2
strategy—and this is far better suited to traditional American ideology, values,
2The United States has certainly executed pro-active programs in the Cold War World,
however they have been on a second order (or micro-level) strategic plane. Containing
communism, which is clearly a reactive posture, has been the first order (or macro-level) goal
of all supporting policy in the Cold War era.
history and spirit than is a reactive posture. The U.S. Navy need not fear the
assumption of a pro-active global strategy or assume that it will automatically
become a more vulnerable target of the budget axe because of it. The U.S.
navy can and should thrive in this environment, since it has been
historically committed to instilling this mindset, internally, at every level of
naval command. Therefore, the Navy need not fear an external
environment which demands pro-active thinking, since it surely possesses
the intellectual and experiential muscle to make its case in a dynamic policy
formulation setting. The new international environment, while not to be
feared, will, however, change the rules of the game. It will demand the
formulation of new, inspired and creative visions for national policy and
forward-looking strategies to match. Warmed-over Cold War strategy is no
longer sufficient; it is not acceptable to U.S. allies, it is not acceptable to
Congress, it is not acceptable to top administration officials, and it is not
acceptable to the American public. It is within this basic context that any
strategic plan or issue of politico-military significance must be viewed.
B. PURPOSE AND OBJECTIVES
The objective of this thesis is to examine the value of naval arms control
in the post-Cold War world, within the framework of a new paradigm for
international relations and new critical priorities on the national agenda.
Instead of focusing on the quantitative questions of platform procurement
and military utility, this historical juncture demands a philosophical, rather
than a technical or dogmatic approach to questions of the role of naval force
in the newly emerging national security environment. Following a
normative methodological review of naval arms control policy, a distinct
second phase of imaginative political packaging and salesmanship will be
required to transform the recommendations reached here into workable
Washington policy.
Since the world has changed so dramatically, the conceptual models used
to evaluate the Navy's role in post-Cold War defense posture must also
change in order to effectively model the new environment. For the purposes
of assessing the potential value of naval arms control in the post-Cold War
world, this thesis provides a new model for evaluating naval arms control
proposals based upon a top-down cognitive flow methodology, consistent
with the broad outlines of President Bush's new national security strategy"3 .
The top-down approach taken here (which employs a specifically articulated
relationship between ends and means) is required in the current strategic
environment, just as the top-down review of American defense structure
(initiated by the President's Aspen speech) is now appropriate. This approach
implies that an increased level of sustained inter-agency cooperation can take
place to facilitate a long term national vision. Sustained bureaucratic
cooperation is not the norm in a democratic government; the positions of
various departments and agencies are often at odds as they each attempt to
effectively represent differing constituencies. The methodology advocated
here (a formal, top-down approach) is more reminiscent of classical Soviet
3See George Bush, "Remarks by the President to the Aspen Institute Symposium" (as
delivered), Office of the Press Secretary (Aspen, Colorado), The White House, August 2, 1990.
Ultimately, a permanent title for the strategy will be coined by the administration or emerge
from another source. In the interim, the title "new national security strategy" has been chosen
by the administration to fill the need of a standard label.
style strategic planning than the typically more ad hoc American style. While
virtually no one would postulate that the results of the Soviet political
system are desirable, western analysts of Soviet defense planning would
contend that there are valuable lessons which can be borrowed from the
formal process of establishing national military policy.
In the present era of declining resources available for defense programs, a
top-down, streamlined, blueprint for national security strategy must be
fashioned to garner consensus support among the legislative and executive
branches of government and the public at large (much as the containment
strategy did). This is precisely the process that has begun via President Bush's
speech to the Aspen Institute (see chapter 4). While the specifics of the new
strategy are yet to be decided, certain basic concepts associated with it (e.g.
smaller budgets for all services via a restructuring process, more emphasis on
"jointness" to consolidate DOD functions, procuring forces which can be
more flexibly employed across the full spectrum of potential combat intensity,
etc.) are going to happen. Now the armed services and other key players need
to begin formulating positions on specific issues, such as arms control,
designed to meet the basic concepts of the new strategy and the future
planning, programming and warfighting directives which are likely to be
based upon it.
C ORGANIZATION AND APPROACH
Rather than focusing on NATO-Warsaw Pact order-of-battle calculus (as
was typical during the Cold War) the model proposed in this thesis attempts
to view naval arms control in the context of the new critical components of
national security, namely: national budget and defense resource constraints;
military flexibility and mobility; expansion of U.S. military service roles to
include increased statesmanship in the new world order; concern for the
environment; humanitarian programs; and a renewed emphasis on
education. The critical dilemma which will be addressed is how to maintain
a potent, viable, fighting navy—designed to prevail against possible
adversaries in times of crisis (and against a potentially rejuvenated Soviet
threat)—while simultaneously functioning as a significant diplomatic player
abroad (in the new world order) and as a credible political player at home in
the domestic policy debate.4 Clearly, institutions which lose domestic political
credibility will become irrelevant during the policy formulation process, a
process which will surely be dominated by an increasingly introspective
national agenda for the foreseeable future. An institution perceived as
4Recommendations to be wary of a power grab by the Army and Air Force, with respect to
the Unified Command Plan (UCP) which will emerge from the new strategy, is arguably
premature and counter-productive. For a recent example of this approach see the lead off
article in the 1991 Naval Review issue of Proceedings : RADM J.C Wylie, USN (ret.), "Heads
Up, Navy," U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings. Vol. 117, No. 5, May 1991, pp. 17-18. The
Secretary of Defense and the Chairman of the JCS have described their vision of the future
U.S. Navy in terms which should be reassuring (e.g. maritime superiority, power projection and
sea control). If these statements accurately reflect the desires of the Secretary and the CJCS,
then crying foul prematurely is not in the Navy's best interest. The Navy will have to endure a
share of the force structure cuts dictated by this process and will undergo restructuring along
with the other services. The Navy would do well to play the role of unselfish team player at
this point in the debate, garner political capital from such a stance, and then go to 'battle
stations" if and when unfairly or inappropriately brought under siege. Before that
determination can be made, however, some type of "debate" of strawman UCP proposals is
destined to occur. The Navy should concentrate on building its case for such second order policy
questions in a manner consistent with the favorable description of the future U.S. Navy which
has already occurred; see, for example James L. George, "A Strategy in the Navy's Best
Interest," (1991 Prize Essay Contest winner), U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings, Vol. 117, No. 5,
May 1991, pp. 114-123. Crying wolf should be reserved for real evidence of manipulating the
UCP debate, not for the initiation of a debate process.
bureaucratically irrelevant and out-of-step will be a sure loser in the resource
allocation game, regardless of the intellectual purity of it's positions or
successful track-record of the past.
It is instructive to recall that arms control is conceptually no different
than any other tool of statesmanship; it can be used as a "cooperative" tool for
building a better diplomatic relationship or it can be used as a "competitive"
tool for securing politico-military advantages in the international arena.
Throughout the history of the superpower relationship, the United States has
been predisposed to viewing arms control as "cooperative" while the Soviets
have viewed it as "competitive." For the United States to most effectively
employ the arms control tool (of which one possible choice is to refrain from
it entirely) a comprehensive review of naval arms control's place in post-Cold
War security strategy is in order. Rather than examine naval arms control
questions in a vacuum of maritime analysis, which is frequently done, this
thesis attempts to put the question back into a coherent strategic context,
subordinating it to higher order political and military objectives of the United
States at this juncture of history
P
^This viewpoint was also the central theme of James L. George, "A Strategy in the Navy's
Best Interest," (1991 Prize Essay Contest winner), U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings, Vol. 117,
No. 5, May 1991, pp. 114-123.
II. NAVAL ARMS CONTROL IN THE COLD WAR: FUTURISTIC OR
FOLLY?
A. BACKGROUND
Throughout the history of the Cold War, naval arms control has been a
favorite subject of the Soviets, who desired to constrain, in any way possible,
the more powerful and technologically superior U.S. Navy. Although the
international environment may have fundamentally changed since Soviet
naval arms control proposals were first voiced, the ideas which comprise the
proposals, the supporting literature, and the players (on both sides of the now
defunct "iron curtain") have not. If new ideas are to emerge in this field, they
will most likely germinate from "old" ones, spawned in the era of Cold War.
It is imperative, therefore, that strategic planners be well informed and
conversant with the Soviets' proposed schemes for naval arms control. Was
the Soviets' fixation with naval arms control actually ahead of it's time,
geostrategically, or was it (and does it continue to be) little more than a waste
of time?6 To answer this question, it must be realized that the Soviets have
6There is a general consensus in the academic community that now is not the appropriate
time for naval arms control, but that an appropriate time may come to exist in the future. For
reasons why naval arms control may make more sense in the future, but not in the current
international environment, see James J. Tritten " "Naval" Arms Control: A Poor Choice of
Words and an Idea Whose Time Has Yet to Come". Current Research on Peace and Violence,
Tampere Peace Research Institute, Tampere Finland, Vol XIII, No. 2, 1990, pp. 65-86. For
reasons why naval arms control made sense in the Cold War, but not in light of the current
internal priorities of the Soviet government, see Georgi Sturua (The Institute of World Economy
and International Relations) "Naval Arms Control: An Idea Whose Time Has Passed",
Presentation to the Naval Arms Limitation and Maritime Security Conference, sponsored by
the Center for Foreign Policy Studies, Dalhousie University, Halifax, Nova Scotia, 26 June
1990.
8
advocated nearly every possible way to constrain all significant capabilities of
the US Navy. Despite Soviet persistence, naval issues never came to the
forefront of the superpower arms control agenda because the concept of
negotiating naval issues was steadfastly rejected by U.S. government policy
(not just by the Navy) for a variety of reasons (which can be summarized in
nine specific items):
• Naval arms control is inherently difficult because naval forces are
"...diverse, hard to compare, flexible and mobile/'7
• The historical record of attempts to control naval armaments is
generally perceived as disappointing, especially the Washington and
London Naval Treaties of the interwar period.8
• Maritime nations value naval assets far greater than do continental
powers.9
• Maritime nations are more concerned about constraints upon the
freedom of navigation than are continental powers because of the
7Geoffrey Till, "Naval Arms Control Between the Great Powers: The Lessons of the Past",
Naval Arms Limitations and Maritime Security Conference, (sponsored by the Center for
Foreign Policy Studies, Dalhousie University) Halifax, Nova Scotia, 26-28 June 1990), p. 26.
8The Washington and London precedents, along with the others of the interwar period,
are still fertile fields for professional evaluation and debate. While some benefits to the effort
existed, they were swept away in the rising tensions which led to the Second World War.
Geoffrey Till's observation that "...arms control often appears as much a consequence as a cause
of improved relations" ("Naval Arms Control Between the Great Powers: The Lessons of the
Past", Naval Arms Limitations and Maritime Security Conference, (sponsored by the Center for
Foreign Policy Studies, Dalhousie University) Halifax, Nova Scotia, 26-28 June 1990) is a clear
historical signpost that is equally germane today. See also, for example: Barry Hunt, "Of Bits
and Bridles": Sea Power and Arms Control Prior to World War II. Presentation to the Naval
Arms Limitation and Maritime Security Conference, sponsored by the Center for Foreign Policy
Studies, Dalhousie University, Halifax, Nova Scotia, 26 June 1990; Toward a New Order of Sea
Power: American Naval Policy and the World Scene, 1918-1922. Princeton University Press,
London.: 1946; and Samuel Flagg Bemis, A Diplomatic History of the United States (5th ed.),
chapter XXXVI, Holt, Rinehart, and Winston, Inc, New York.: 1967.
9See Colin S. Gray, The Wartime Influence of Sea Power upon Land Power, Final report for
the Chief of Naval Operations, National Security Research Inc.:, Washington, D.C. 1987.
9
maritime approach to national security and the fostering of overseas
economic interests.10
The U.S. can justify the need for naval superiority to counterbalance
Soviet conventional superiority in Europe and elsewhere. 11
Naval arms control has not been perceived as being as urgent an item
for the superpower agenda as strategic nuclear arms control.12
Intrusive inspection regimes are not attractive to the side which "has
more to lose". The U.S., although philosophically enthusiastic about
intrusive inspection regimes in the strategic nuclear or conventional
ground force contexts (arenas of competition in which it feels
"behind") would be reluctant to compromise it's clear technological
and qualitative naval superiority (an arena in which it feels "ahead") to
intelligence collection from abroad.13
Soviet arms control initiatives have been numerous and sporadic,
resembling diplomatic trial balloons replete with repetitive ideological
rhetoric rather than by being packaged and marketed as serious, "front
burner" diplomatic proposals.14
10A recent expression of these Mahaniaa tenets is ADM Carlisle A.H. Trost,"Soviets know
Navy is the key to U.S. Strength", The Stars and Stripes. September 26, 1989, p.10.
n Ibid.
12One simple evidence of this is the relatively small place that naval issues occupy at
summit meetings of superpower leaders (CDR R. Mitchell Brown, USN, OP-06 Chair of
Strategic Planning at the Naval Postgraduate School, interviewed by the author on December
12, 1989 following CDR Brown's receipt of a debriefing of the Malta Superpower summit at
sea). Another example is the willingness of the Soviet Union to accept the exclusion of navies
from the CFE mandate (see Ronald O'Rourke, "Naval Arms Control", CRS Issue Brief, 8
February 1990, pp. 1-2).
13See, for example. James J. Tritten " "Naval" Arms Control: A Poor Choice of Words and
an Idea Whose Time Has Yet to Come". Current Research on Peace and Violence, Tampere
Peace Research Institute, Tampere Finland, Vol XIII, No. 2, 1990, pp. 65-86 and Radm J.R. Hill
(RN, ret.) Arms Control at Sea. Naval Institute, Annapolis, MD.: 1989.
14This was recently admitted to by a visible Soviet academic, Dr. Georgi Sturua (The
Institute of World Economy and International Relations) "Naval Arms Control: An Idea Whose
Time Has Passed". Presentation to the Naval Arms Limitation and Maritime Security
Conference, sponsored by the Center for Foreign Policy Studies, Dalhousie University, Halifax,
Nova Scotia, 26 June 1990.
10
• Soviet adventurism (principally the Brezhnev Doctrine) has derailed
potential avenues for superpower agreement. (A conservative backlash
by the Gorbachev government against its people threatens to derail the
process again). This derailment has occurred primarily in the strategic
nuclear arena, but other arms control avenues have also been affected
(perhaps even including naval arms control).15
During the Cold War, the Soviet Union took every opportunity to score
points in the East-West ideological struggle with their positions on, among
other issues, naval arms control. The general thrust was that if the US
strategy of containment was purely defensive, then why was the US Navy not
only capable of massive, nuclear strikes against the Soviet homeland but why
was it also routinely deployed in geographic position to execute such an
attack, exercised in a manner indicative of a desire to perfect the technique,
and why did it continue to develop the technological means to do it better? It
should be noted that the Soviet Union was not only using naval arms control
as ideological cannon fodder; it had real fears that the United States was
preparing a nuclear assault against it in the early 1980s. 16 The US Maritime
Strategy was another piece of supporting evidence, in the minds of some
15A clear example of this is the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. Not only was SALT II a
victim of this incident, but several proposals, at least of some interest to the Carter
administration (particularly ASW free zones) went dead in the water. For example see James J.
Tritten '"Naval' Arms Control: A Poor Choice of Words and an Idea Whose Time Has Yet to
Come". Current Research on Peace and Violence, Tampere Peace Research Institute, Tampere
Finland, Vol XIII, No. 2, 1990, pp. 65-86. This list of factors which contribute to the back-burner
status of naval arms control is not intended to be all inclusive or itemized in order of importance.
It is simply a brief synopsis of the issues evident in the existing literature.
16The depiction of American cruise missile trajectories over Norway and Sweden
effectively served to exacerbate the highly sensitive implications of cruise missile
deployments and the execution of the U.S. maritime strategy (Whence the Threat to Peace
(1982 ed.), USSR Ministry of Defense, Moscow, 1982).
11
Soviet defense analysts, that the United States was preparing a nuclear attack
upon the Soviet Union.17
If the concept of naval arms control is about to enter a new contextual era,
then it is important to be aware of the various alternatives for naval arms
control which have already been considered in order to assess what aspects, if
any, are relevant, useful, workable, and potentially in the US national
interest. Table 1, below, is an organized presentation of proposed avenues for
naval arms control).18
TABLE I. POSSIBLE AVENUES FOR NAVAL ARMS CONTROL
• RESTRICTIONS ON CAPABILITY
A) Limitation on Weapons of Mass Destruction
1) Nuclear Weapons
a) Total Naval Nuclear Arsenal
b) Nuclear Weapons Deployment
c) Nuclear Weapons Testing
2) Chemical Weapons
a) Total Naval Chemical Arsenal
b) Chemical Weapons Deployment
c) Chemical Weapons Testing
3) Biological Weapons
a) Total Naval Biological Arsenal
17Reports are beginning to surface that the cumulative effect of several strategic and
political effects during this period caused real panic in the Kremlin about possible U.S.
intentions to launch a nuclear strike against the USSR, most notably: deployment of Pershing II
(see Oleg Gordievsky "Pershing Paranoia in the Kremlin" , London The Times in English,
February 27, 1990, pp. 12-13 (FBIS-SOV-90-052-A, March 16, 1990, pp. 76-80, 79)); and the
saber-rattling rhetoric of top Reagan administration officials (in the form of public statements
by President Reagan, Secretary of State Haig and Presidential Counselor Edwin Meese on the
fighting of a limited nuclear war and American willingness to reinterpret or ignore provisions of
previous arms control agreements).
^Outline typology is the author's, however the substance of the typological breakdown
has been drawn from several sources, including: James J. Tritten," "Naval Arms Control: A Poor
Choice of Words and an Idea Whose Time Has Yet To Come", Radm J.R. Hill. Arms Control at
Sea j_and Office of the Chief of Naval Operations, "Report on Naval Arms Control" (submitted
to the the Senate Committee on Armed Services and The House Committee on Armed Services),
April, 1991.
12
b) Biological Weapons Deployment
c) Biological Weapons Testing
B) Limitations on total force structure quantity (e.g. total number of
ships allowed, etc.).
O Limitations on specific categories of force structure quantity/quality
(e.g. size of combatants, numbers of missiles that can be carried,
etc.) This is the brand of naval arms control which was undertaken
during the inter-war period (via limitations on battleship and
cruiser construction).








E) Limitation on total resource level allocated to the Navy (i.e. only a
specified navy budget is permitted). While this idea is possioly
attractive to defense oudget cutters and is, theoretically, a legitimate
path to arms control objectives (see chapter three;, it is highly
problematic because: it violates the established concept of a
sovereign nation-state's right to a self-defense policy of its own
choosing, verification concerns, and the justification for national
naval power which is independent from the size/ capability of
another nation's navy.
RESTRICTIONS ON OPERATIONS
A) Limitation on naval exercises
1) Limitation by number allowed
a) Global in scope
b) Regional in scope
2) Limitation by type/ size allowed
a) Global in scope
b) Regional in scope
3) Limitation by duration allowed
a) Global in scope
b) Regional in scope
B) Limitation on peacetime deployment of naval power
1) Limitation by number allowed
a) Global in scope
b) Regional in scope
2) Limitation by type allowed
a) Global in scope
b) Regional in scope
13
C) Limitation on deployment of specific naval capabilities, for
example
1) Zones of Peace
2) Nuclear Free Zones
a) Global in scope
b) Regional in scope
3) Nuclear Weapons Free Zones
a) Global in scope
b) Regional in scope
4) ASW Free Zones
5) SSBN Safe Havens
a) Global in scope
b) Regional in scope
• CONFIDENCE AND SECURITY BUILDING MEASURES
A) Measures designed to strengthen politico-military predictability
(via enhanced transparency). Examples include:
1) Static Data Exchanges
2) Notification of Naval Exercises
3) Bilateral /Multilateral Crisis Control Procedures
4) Doctrinal Talks
B) Measures designed to strengthen politico-military relationships




3) Professional Journal Article Exchanges
C) Measures designed to "deconflict" potentially dangerous naval
activities
1) Via agreed procedure (e.g. the 1972 Incidents at Sea Agreement
(INCSEA), the Dangerous Military Activities Agreement
(DMA), the Ballistic Missile Launch Notification Agreement,
The Respective Rights of Innocent Passage through Territorial
Waters Statement, The Law of the Sea (Nautical "Rules-of-the-
Road" portion, not seabed mining rights portion), etc.
2) Via agreed technological standard (e.g. SLBM permissive action
links (PALS)).
3) Via declaratory weapons employment policies (e.g. no first use
of nuclear weapons).
D) Measures designed to use naval assets to contribute to top
national/international items of priority, for example:
1) Common naval procedures for bilateral/multilateral
environmental protection/ clean-up
2) Common naval procedures for humanitarian relief operations
(Source: the author)
14
It should be noted that the United States has not objected to all proposals.
In fact, it has led the process and signed agreements which can be
characterized as some of the most successful arms control agreements in
force, namely the agreements on naval confidence building measures
designed to "deconflict" potentially dangerous naval activities and those
providing for military-to-military contacts (section 3C of Table 1).
A brief overview of these alternatives can shed light upon potentially
promising regimes and those that appear of little value. 19
B. RESTRICTIONS ON CAPABILITY
The history of arms control shows a general abhorrence for agreement
between nations which impose "a capability vacuum"; traditional arms
control regimes have codified both improved qualitative and quantitative
enhancements to capability. Notable exceptions are the ABM (Anti-Ballistic
Missile) Treaty (which constrained an avenue of the arms race that, for
different reasons, both superpowers chose not to embark upon); the INF
Treaty (which was a complete anathema, heralded as a great success) and the
naval agreements of the interwar period. In the latter case, the restrictions on
battleship and cruiser construction simply provided incentives for redirecting
the naval arms race onto other platforms, notably submarines, aircraft
carriers, and more heavily armed cruisers. This regime did little, if anything,
to reduce the signatory nations' capability to wage destructive warfare by sea
via means not directly addressed in the treaties. If that was condition was not
19Radm J.R. Hill. Arms Control at Sea and James J. Tritten, ""Naval" Arms Control: A
Poor Choice of Words and An Idea Whose Time has Yet to Come" are excellent references.
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bad enough, warship construction specifications that were specifically
included in the treaties were flagrantly violated by Germany, Italy, and Japan.
Perhaps more significant than the occurrence of flagrant cheating was that the
British government (and perhaps others as well) unequivocally knew that
violations were occurring and chose not to go public with them. For
example, Great Britain had the opportunity to weigh an Italian cruiser in its
Gibraltar drydock, and after discovering that it exceeded the 10,000 ton weight
limit, hid its findings.20 "In yet another case, the British Admiralty continued
to record the incorrect but treaty-compliant tonnage for the German battleship
BISMARK, even after it was sunk and the Royal Navy's Intelligence Division
had examined the surviving ship's logs and crew." 21
Democracies have, for political reasons, historically demonstrated
reluctance to publicize clear treaty violations for fear of exacerbating the
problem further and for fear of jeopardizing administration credibility. The
Reagan administration, for example, was accused of trying to whip up anti-
Soviet fervor by making official protests and public disclosures regarding
Soviet violation of the ABM treaty (the object of the dispute was the
Krasnoyarsk phased array radar). When President Gorbachev and former
Foreign Minister Schevardnadze admitted (in the spirit of glasnost) that
Krasnoyarsk was indeed an ABM Treaty violation, Western apologists for
20Stephen Roskill, Naval Policy Between the Wars, Vol. II-The Period of Reluctant
Rearmament 1930-1939. Annapolis. Maryland: Naval Institute Press, 1976, p. 371.
21 Bruce D. Berkowitz and Allen E. Goodman. Strategic Intelligence for American National
Security, Princeton, New Jersey, 1989, pp. 99-100; and Barton Whaley, Covert German
Rearmament, 1919-1939: Deception and Misperception, Frederick, Maryland: University Press
of America, 1984, pp. 91-93 .
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Soviet defense policy found their traditional, Cold War justifications for
Soviet arms control positions had lost a considerable degree of credibility.
The most disturbing aspect of the Krasnoyarsk radar dispute was that while
the Soviets were publicly questioning the administration's commitment to
preserving the integrity of the ABM Treaty (by questioning the legality of
American pursuance of SDI), they were knowingly and flagrantly violating
the very same treaty. Even more recently than the Krasnoyarsk confrontation,
serious concerns about Soviet violation of the INF treaty (due to the
stockpiling/distribution of SS-23 intermediate range missiles to satellite
states) under the surfaced and then were quietly killed; similarly, concerns
over Soviet attempts to circumvent portions of the Conventional Forces in
Europe (CFE) Treaty are currently being monitored.22
While causing doubts about their own compliance with the INF Treaty
and the unratified CFE Treaty, the Soviet Union still would like to negotiate
the reduction of the Tomahawk SLCM and even American aircraft carriers, if
possible. (It is critical to remember that regardless of Gorbachev's true colors,
the defense establishment which will supervise and direct any arms control
negotiation are pedigreed cold warriors of long standing.) The SLCM is of
grave concern to Soviet defense planners and has provided the impetus for
the SLCM control measures which they have advocated in recent years:23
• SLCM range limited to 600 km (proposed during SALT II)
^For additional information on both of these cases see chapter three.
^In Whence the Threat to Peace (1892 ed.), USSR Ministry of Defense, Moscow, 1982, the
depiction of American cruise missile trajectories over Norway and Sweden effectively served to
exacerbate the highly sensitive political implications of the "dual track" cruise missile
deployments and the execution of the U.S. maritime strategy.
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Prohibition of SLCMs w/range>600km until 31 Dec 81 (SALT II
Protocol-June, 1979)
Ban on deployment of SLCM w/range>600km (START negotiations
1982-June 1986)
Ban on surface based SLCMs w/range>600km/numerical ceiling on
submarine launched SLCMs (June, 1986)
Ceiling of 400 nuclear SLCMs w/range>600km, all on submarines
(Soviet draft agreement for START, July 1987)
Limitation of 6000 nuclear SLCM warheads, 1,600 strategic offensive
delivery systems (agreement, distinct from START, during Reagan-
Gorbachev Summit, Washington D.C., December, 1987).
Expansion of above to stringent on-site inspection rqts.
Ceiling of 1000 for all long-range (>600km) SLCMs-600 conventional
(on certain categories of ships)-400 nuclear on two types of submarines
and one type of surface ship.24
• Exchange of data on nuclear SLCMs (with range of 300-600 KM). The
confidential exchanges will take place annually.25
The United States has been firmly opposed to limitation of this system by
formal negotiation for several reasons: it would set a potentially dangerous
precedent of capability limitation, the inherent force multiplier effect of the
system is critical to maintain if aggregate numbers of platforms are to be
reduced, and there are highly complex verification issues associated with such
a regime. 26 A sense of the Senate amendment to the FY1990 defense
24The above listing is provided in David S. Yost "Controlling Sea Launched Cruise
Missiles-The Most Difficult Question." U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings (vol. 115), September
1989, pp. 61-70.
^Office of the Chief of Naval Operations, "Report on Naval Arms Control" (submitted to
the the Senate Committee on Armed Services and The House Committee on Armed Services),
April, 1991, p.7.
26Some possible verification schemes can be found in Valerie Thomas. "Three Approaches
to Reductions in Tactical Naval Nuclear Weapons". Presentation to the Naval Arms
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authorization bill (S. 1352, passed on 1 August 1989) stated that any agreement
on reducing or limiting strategic nuclear arms "should not prohibit or limit
the deployment of nonnuclear cruise missiles."27 The ultimate effect of
OPERATION DESERT STORM will be interesting to track, since it could
stimulate more intensity to constrain this system, or stimulate precisely the
opposite effect; reportedly, the Soviets would like to restrain the newly
demonstrated US SLCM capability (which reinforces their fear of the effect of
sea power upon the land theater) but might also like to reserve the right to
obtain this capability for itself.
Proposals for the complete ban of naval nuclear weapons are discussed
frequently in the literature. Supporters of banning naval nuclear weapons
(other than submarine-launched ballistic missiles) include Admiral William
Crowe, USN (ret.), former Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and Paul
Nitze, former U.S. arms control negotiator.28 These proponents argue that
since the Soviet Navy is more heavily nuclear-armed and better prepared for
nuclear war at sea than U.S. and its allies, nuclear war at sea would benefit the
Soviet Union and possibly eliminate allied technological and conventional
weapon superiority. A naval stalemate or "nuclear draw" would be to the
strategic advantage of the Soviet Union, because the naval factor in military
science is not central to its security and potential war effort, whereas it is very
important to the security and the potential war effort of the United States and
Limitation and Maritime Security Conference, sponsored by the Center for Foreign Policy
Studies, Dalhousie University, Halifax, Nova Scotia, 27 June 1990.
27Congressional Record, daily ed., 1 August 1989: S9198-S9199.
280'Rourke p. 12.
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its allies. Banning nuclear weapons from naval forces would presumably
eliminate the possibility of the Soviets resorting to nuclear war at sea to
reverse losses in conventional naval warfare and would not test the concept
of a firebreak between nuclear war at sea and nuclear war ashore. Such a ban
would also eliminate the risk of a peacetime nuclear-weapon-related accident
at sea, and reduce the potential escalation of any U.S.-Soviet naval incident.
It would reduce the naval administrative workload associated with deploying
nuclear weapons at sea, and it would free up scarce magazine space on the
ships for conventional weapons that are much more likely to be used,
especially in crisis-response operations in the Third World. A nuclear
weapons ban would carry the side benefit of eliminating the political and
public relations problems associated with the presence of nuclear-weapon-
capable ships in foreign ports and waters (e.g. New Zealand). Since the
United States is already phasing out older naval nuclear weapons because
they are no longer militarily useful (the submarine launched anti-submarine
rocket (SUBROC)29 , the surface launched anti-submarine rocket (ASROC),
and the nuclear surface to air missile (TERRIER BTN); banning naval nuclear
weapons would thus only continue an effort that the U.S. Navy has already
begun to implement. 30
Opponents of a ban argue that even if the agreement is strategically
desirable, it would be impossible to verify and has a dangerous potential for
nuclear breakout. They also assert that naval nuclear weapons are still
29Parenthetical note was inserted by the author.
^O'Rourke p. 12.
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needed to defend a post-INF European Theater, and other overseas allies, and
that the administrative workload and isolated problem of New Zealand do
not justify the sacrifice of a potentially important strategic capability.
Despite the specter of the oft discussed "slippery slope" leading from
acceptable naval arms control regimes uncontrollably to unacceptable ones, a
ban on all naval nuclear weapons could theoretically lock-in American naval
superiority, vis-a-vis not only the Soviet Union but future seaborne nuclear
threats from a plethora of other sources as well (see the possible future
international paradigms discussed in chapter 3). Such a ban would only be
acceptable, however, if a sufficient compliance scheme is first, possible;
second, able to be fully adopted (i.e. enforceable); and third, multilateral in
design. In the post-Cold War world, countries other than the big five nuclear
powers are sure to develop nuclear weapons that have the means for some
type of naval application, even if initially crude (e.g. a nuclear armed Indian
Navy). It is surely in the national security interest to prevent U.S. naval
forces from facing a third world nuclear threat in a time of crisis. Consider
how differently the US Navy would have operated in OPERATION DESERT
STORM if Saddam Hussein's Iraq had been thought capable of possessing
even the crudest nuclear weapon aboard a naval patrol boat. Despite the
theoretical merit of such a treaty, it is extremely difficult to imagine the
translation of the concept of banning nuclear weapons into a workable and
verifiable multilateral agreement when there has been so little progress on
naval arms control in the bilateral framework. With the removal of U.S.
nuclear systems from Europe (as a result of the INF Treaty), sea based nuclear
SLCM has become an important weapon system which can be quickly
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returned to the European theater in order to bolster deterrence in time of
crisis or war, without exposing U.S. allies to the political firestorm resulting
from the basing of nuclear weapons ashore.
Another avenue of capability limitation schemes that the Soviet Union is
pursuing is a trade of attack submarines for American aircraft carriers. These
ideas, in their current form, have questionable military soundness (since the
submarines considered are from obsolete classes) and should not be allowed
to enter the debate, unless and until the new world order evolves into a more
predictable cooperative structure over the long term.
C RESTRICTIONS ON OPERATIONS
The conceptual basis for restrictions on operations has been in existence
for quite some time and been increasingly emphasized and advocated in the
Gorbachev regime. Exercises could be limited, regulated, and observed, using
the Helsinki and Stockholm models now in force for land exercises.31
Application of the Stockholm Agreement (now superseded by the Vienna
1990 Document on Confidence and Security Building Measures) directly in
the blue water naval theater has been rejected by the western nations on
many occasions. Restrictions could also be placed upon certain types of
operations (e.g. limitations on forward deployed forces, ASW free zones,
nuclear free zones, SSBN safe havens, etc).
Area proposals are probably the least likely regime since they exploit, to
the advantage of the Soviet Union and perhaps more importantly, other
31 Hill, p.70.
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potential adversaries, the difference in naval force structure and operating
philosophies between advanced Western navies and the rest of the world.
ASW free zones, for instance, would greatly assist the Soviet Union and any
other participant in solving one of the most difficult strategic targeting
problems: localization of U.S. ballistic missile submarines. Similarly,
limitations on forward deployed forces and nuclear free zones/zones of peace
also prey upon the asymmetries of the two navies. Of particular concern in
many quarters is the cumulative decoupling effect of the INF treaty and
nuclear free zones (in the Mediterranean or northern theaters) on the
European balance of power equation.32 If this were not enough, the
definitional, verification and enforcement hurdles which must be overcome
for such a regime would be extraordinarily complex (e.g. basing questions
within the zones, the role of superpower allies and circumvention strategies
(reflagging of ships/retitling of bases), etc.).33
The Soviet have repeatedly stated proposals for nuclear free zones and
have, not surprisingly, focused their rhetoric on areas most closely adjacent to
the Soviet homeland:
We have proposed a limitation of military-naval activity in the
northern seas, the Mediterranean, the Indian Ocean, and the Pacific to
the West several times.... However the United States and its allies reject
even the possibility of conducting dialogue in this field. They attempt to
justify this refusal with the most varied arguments: the freedom of
passage, the inability to organize monitoring [kontrola] of military-naval
forces' activities, the vulnerability of its communications, and so on.
32Ambassador Robert Blackwell, special assistant to the President for Eastern European
affairs (National Security Council Staff), Superintendent's Guest Lecture presented at the
Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, Ca., August 9, 1989.
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The real reason lies in the West's refusal to give up its superiority at sea.
This is where the main obstacle on the road to turning the seas and
oceans into a peace zone lies.34
America, as the world's only maritime superpower, has little or nothing
to gain by restrictions on operations (regardless of the final character of the
emerging world paradigm). Steadfast U.S. commitment to the principle of
Freedom of the Seas has been constantly and unequivocally articulated in all
relevant policy statements.
D. CONFIDENCE AND SECURITY BUILDING MEASURES (CSBMS)
The objective of confidence building measures is to bolster security and
stability through political predictability and military transparency. They can
encompass a broad range of activities which include: the exchange of
strategists (military and civilian), bilateral/multilateral wargaming and
simulations, data exchanges, advanced notification of weapons testing,
measures to prevent the occurrence of dangerous incidents at sea,
strengthening of the role of permissive action links (PALs), and
doctrinal /declaratory policy statements (e.g. no first use of nuclear weapons
at sea policy). This arena contains several potentially useful arms control
regimes.
To begin with, strategist exchanges are already being conducted as part of
the overall effort to improve superpower relations (an exchange of senior
33See, for example, Hill, pp 80-81, 138, 168-71.
34An Interview with Fleet Admiral Nikolayevich Chernavin, Commander in Chief of the
Soviet Navy, by Miroslav Lazanski, in Zagreb Danas in Serbo-Croatian, Moscow, May 30, 1989,
pp. 51-54, (FBIS-SOV-89-112-A, June 13, 1989, p. 4 and JPRS-UMA-89-009-L, August 8, 1989,
p.4).
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officer students of U.S. and Soviet war colleges was recently conducted
following the planting of the seeds for such ventures via the Admiral
Crowe/General Akhromeyev reciprocal visits).35 Additionally, the Soviet
Union and United States signed the 1988 Ballistic Missile Launch Notification
Agreement and the 1989 Dangerous Military Activities (DMA)36 agreement,
expanding on the successful 1972 Incidents at Sea Agreement ("INCSEA,"
1972). INCSEA has nearly eliminated the dangerous confrontations that were
once all too prevalent.37 The Soviet Union has not stressed this theme in
their literature recently due to apparent prioritization of other proposals
(especially ship/submarine launched cruise missile (SLCM) control). They
have indicated at INCSEA review commissions, however, that they are
interested in expansion of the INCSEA model38 and they have formally
proposed several naval CSBMs in March 1989 at the CSBM talks of the
Vienna meeting of the 35 nation Conference on Security and Cooperation in
Europe (CSCE). Additional milestones in US-Soviet naval CSBMs are the
35CAPT Peter Rice (participant in U.S. National Defense University-former Voroshilov
Military Academy Exchange (September 15-19 1989) presentation for the National Security
Affairs Department, Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, Ca., November 6, 1989.
36 James J. Tritten " "Naval" Arms Control: A Poor Choice of Words and an Idea Whose
Time Has Yet to Come". Current Research on Peace and Violence, Tampere Peace Research
Institute, Tampere Finland, Vol XIII, No. 2, 1990, p. 80.
3
^In the past the Navy took great pains to make the distinction between maritime safety
agreements (such as INCSEA and DMA) and arms control confidence building measures.
38Capt Jack Grunawalt, USN (ret.), "Rules of Engagement Seminar" presentation by the
Naval War College to deploying surface forces, Long Beach Naval Station, Long Beach, Ca.,
February 8, 1989.
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1989 US-Soviet Joint Statement On Rights of Innocent Passage through
Territorial Waters and Reciprocal port visits in 1989 and 1990.
The conduct of bilateral /multilateral military simulations and the
exchange of non-sensitive data are in the sphere of confidence building
measures and present some interesting possibilities.39 The Soviets are
missing no opportunities to state their desire for a confidence-building
measures agreement, as this recent statement by Fleet Admiral Chernavin
(Commander-in-Chief of the Soviet Navy) indicates:
The USSR supports the idea of calling a special conference to discuss
questions of limiting the activities of the military-naval forces, as well as
their reduction. We are ready to work toward that aim through an
agreement on the most simple decisions like strengthening confidence-
building measures of trust in relation to military-naval forces. However,
the United States and its allies reject even the possibility of conducting
dialogue in this field....40
The value of CSBMs is the ability to strengthen the military-to-military
relationship and /or the political relationship between nations. One critical
test for their value must be if the political strengthening can be accomplished
without significant loss of military capability or intelligence. Another test is if
the strengthening of the military-to-military relationship has appreciable
value in its own right.
39See Tritten, "Naval Arms Control: An Idea Whose Time Has Yet to Come".
40An Interview with Fleet Admiral Nikolayevich Chernavin, Commander in Chief of the
Soviet Navy, by Miroslav Lazanski, in Zagreb Danas in Serbo-Croatian, Moscow, May 30, 1989,
pp. 51-54, (FBIS-SOV-89-112-A, June 13, 1989, p. 4 and JPRS-UMA-89-009-L, August 8, 1989,
p.4).
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E WHERE IS THE COLD WAR MOMENTUM LEADING US?
Thomas L. Friedman's piece, "Why Arms Control Isn't Sexy Anymore"
makes the case that building a package of security arrangements with a nation
whose future is highly uncertain is a potentially futile business, since the
U.S.-Soviet confrontation is no longer the only game in town.41 The United
States needs to return to an analysis of the basic objectives for arms control
(see chapter 3), explore competing strategies for arms control, and put arms
control back into its strategic context, rather than simply allowing the inertia
of history to carry it forward. Such a redefinition of objectives is only possible
through strong, powerful and credible presidential leadership.
The nine traditional inhibiting factors associated with naval arms control
must be re-examined under "New Thinking." While the ultimate destiny of
perestroika has yet to be decided, the evolution of the superpower arms
control agenda to an era beyond domination by strategic forces only,
willingness of the Soviet Union to negotiate on asymmetrical reductions of
land forces in the CFE context, the more benign tenor of Soviet foreign policy,
and the new willingness to tolerate on-site inspections42, radically alter the
traditional assumptions—all of which make naval arms control a more likely
possibility. During Admiral Trost's tenure as CNO, he delivered a speech
advocating, essentially, to stall the naval arms control process as long as
41Thomas L. Friedman. "Why Arms Control Isn't Sexy Anymore". New York Times, 20
May 1990, pp. 20-21.
42Jeffrey Smith. "Americans Examine a Soviet Warhead". Washington Post, 6 July 1989,
19.
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possible while the West gets more time to draw reliable conclusions about the
true character of the Soviet Union's military reforms. 43 While the Bush
administration adopted this course for the near term (which made sense), the
position has given the Soviets an angle (whether valid or not) for labeling the
Americans as reluctant participants in the new international environment.
The Soviet commander-in-chief of their Naval Force, Fleet Admiral
Vladimir Chernavin, has assessed the situation in the following way:
Our American partners do all they can today in order to have their
naval force outside the agenda. They have advantages in certain aspects
and they don't want to part with them. [Words indistinct] that the
United States is more a sea power than we are, that its sea performs the
function of a communication with the allies and as a protection, and we
as a land power can use trains, doesn't correspond to reality.
So, mutual distrust and inability to understand each other-this is
what we run into in the naval sphere. It seems that we've overcome
that barrier to land and air forces. As far as the naval forces are
concerned, we are only approaching it, and we hope that the stepped-up
contacts between Soviet and American military will help surmount this
obstacle as well.44
Naval arms control has receded from being the "hot topic" that it was
becoming in 1989/1990 for two primary reasons: the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait
and the growing internal unrest and power struggles within the Soviet
Union. Operations DESERT SHIELD and DESERT STORM relegated all other
international issues to the back burner, however war fixation has already
43Admiral Carl A.H. Trost, 'The Danger of Whirlwinds", speech delivered to the Defense
Orientation Conference Association Banquet, San Diego, Ca., September 22, 1989.
44Dobrov, Mikhail, Commentary in World Service, in English, 1510 GMT 21 OCT 1989
(FBIS-SOV-89-204, October 24, 1989, p. 7).
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disappeared. The Soviets can be expected to once again seize opportunities to
lambast American reluctance to negotiate on naval arms (via the usual state-
controlled media and government sources). In fact, the rhetoric can
reasonably be expected to increase in conjunction with any reassertion of the
conservative power bloc within the Soviet government. The Soviets can be
expected to advance proposals for SLCM control and for increased confidence
building measures. This will be, however, low voltage rhetoric for a low
order issue of the US-Soviet agenda.
There are much more significant economic and political issues on the
table and therefore, it is logical to expect that the Soviet Union will continue
to take pot shots at naval arms control, but will not waste scarce high-level
political capital on the subject.45 If the CFE treaty withstands its current
difficulties and is ratified, and if there is continued progress on non-naval
confidence building measures via the CSCE process, the pressure to match
asymmetrical land reductions with asymmetrical naval reductions (both from
the internationally community and from congress) is likely to escalate.
When these forces combine with the fiscal requirements of budget politics,
the prospects for some form of naval arms control become greater still. The
preceding alternatives are, however, only the momentum of naval arms
control's Cold War legacy. If the United States does not want to lag behind
45Georgi Sturua (the Institute of the US and Canada) "Naval Arms Control: An Idea
Whose Time Has Passed.". Presentation to the Naval Arms Limitation and Maritime Security
Conference, sponsored by the Center for Foreign Policy Studies, Dalhousie University, Halifax,
Nova Scotia, 26 June 1990.
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change, coping with the Cold War momentum is not good enough. Naval
Arms control must be redefined in a new and appropriate strategic context.
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III. THE NEW STRATEGIC CONTEXT FOR NAVAL ARMS CONTROL
A. BACKGROUND
The democratic watershed of 1989 has not only permanently affected
relations with the Soviet Union and the face of Europe, it has stimulated
debate of issues whose significance extends well beyond those concerning
Gorbachev's intentions and importance. Several critical implications of the
Gorbachev phenomenon continue to stimulate lively debate, however:
• What will the nature of the government and leadership be which will
ultimately succeed Mikhail Gorbachev?
• Will the Soviet Union actually be able to pursue a non-zero sum game
strategy (as the West would like to believe) or is a zero sum game
strategy inevitable?46
• Is it in the best interests of the United States if Gorbachev succeeds or
fails?47
The issue of Gorbachev's stability is still unclear, especially after the
crackdown on the Baltics and other signs of a conservative backlash. While
Gorbachev must now deal with a more explosive Soviet agenda than was the
case when he initially assumed power (the collapse of every Communist
46The term "zero sum game" is a term of strategic gaming theory. It denotes a gaming
regime in which only one side can win (and the other must lose, by definition). A gaming regime
which postulates an outcome in which both sides can win (or both can lose) is termed a "non-
zero sum game". This reference to gaming theory is often used to introduce the dilemma of
Gorbachev's strategic vision. Is perestroika designed to ultimately strengthen the socialist
state to compete more effectively with the West, similar to the rationale for detente (zero sum
game) or is it designed to forge a more cooperative and peaceful world order in which all will
ultimately benefit and prosper (non-zero sum game)?
47The critical implication of this question begs consideration of the strategic cost of
various political deals intended to "reward Gorbachev". Perhaps an alternative to Gorbachev,
even more friendly to the West, can be encouraged by keeping Gorbachev's feet to the fire.
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regime in Eastern Europe, worsening domestic economic and labor
conditions, worsening ethnic unrest and demands for autonomy, etc.), he has
solidified his power base early in his tenure, established a reform element as a
key power bloc within the Politburo and party apparatus, and has secured for
himself unprecedented emergency powers. Of prime importance to the West,
he has personally engendered an unprecedented degree of excitement for re-
integration of the Soviet future into the Western-led international
community, and is receiving substantial assistance from democratic
governments who fear that any alternative to Gorbachev's central leadership
would be worse.
In regard to Soviet foreign policy, however, much more time will be
required to accumulate enough information to form a consensus on Soviet
defense prioritization; grave contradictions currently exist in defense cuts
announced by the Soviet government, Soviet procurement trends, and
estimated defense spending levels.48 Due to the current contradictory nature
of the evidence, the lag time inherent in even the most sincere attempts to
slow the Soviet military juggernaut, and the critical implications of the final
conclusions of this process, the CIA and the intelligence communities of the
armed services are creating entirely new methodologies to assess Soviet
^See, for example, Representative Les Aspin (D-Wis), Chairman, House Armed Services
Committee "Defense Priorities in the Gorbachev Era", Address to the Fourth Annual AAAS
Colloquium on Science, Arms Control and National Security, Washington D.C., November 16,
1989. This address highlighted uncertainties within the U.S. government concerning the real
trend of Soviet expenditures on modern strategic nuclear systems, R&D, warships, tanks,
aircraft, etc. (trends which may be independent from the elimination of older, obsolete
systems).
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defense efforts in the Gorbachev era.49 The Director of Naval Intelligence,
Radm. Thomas Brooks, USN and Mr. Andrew Marshall, Director of the OSD
Net Assessment Office have announced that the United States has observed
reductions in the exercise and deployment tempos exhibited by the Soviet
navy. 50 Other administration officials have contradicted this view and
postulated that despite patterns which may be emerging in ground forces,
Soviet naval exercise and operations levels may actually be increasing.51 The
administration has concluded, not without dissenters however, that the
prospects of a more cooperatively oriented international system (if not a non-
zero sum game philosophy proper) is too promising not to be pursued
wholeheartedly, and therefore Gorbachev's success was deemed to be in the
long-term best interests of the United States.52
This current climate has raised the specter of unprecedented international
uncertainty and the prospect of peaceful change in many arenas of previous
^Washington Post, 23 February 1989 and lane's Defense Weekly, 17 June 1989.
50 Rear Admiral Thomas A. Brooks, USN, Director of Naval Intelligence, "Testimony
Before the Seapower, Strategic, and Critical Materials Subcommittee of the House Armed
Services Committee on Intelligence Issues", March 7, 1991, pp. 8-12, etc. and Mr. Andrew
Marshall, Director, Office of Net Assessment, Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD),
presentation to the National Security Affairs department, Naval Postgraduate School,
Monterey, Ca, September 24, 1989.
51The Honorable Henry S. Rowen (Assistant Secretary of Defense for International
Security Affairs) "Significance of the Events in Europe and their implications on the Pacific
Rim", Superintendent's Guest Lecture presented at the Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey,
Ca., December 12, 1989.
52Ibid. Additionally, Secretary of Defense Cheney's about face on this question, which
literally occurred within the matter of a few days, following testimony on the question before
congressional committees, is highly indicative of the prelude to, and final adoption of, a
common policy position for the administration.
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superpower confrontation and stalemate, such as Nicaragua and Cambodia.
Progress is also more likely between the two Koreas and in the Middle-East.
Even South Africa, a potential tinderbox of bloody social upheaval, is making
unforeseen progress to peaceful change within this climate. Clearly, this is
the most dynamic period of international change since the beginnings of the
Cold War. It has been fascinating to observe the expanding scope of the
implications associated with this period; not only are political observers
questioning the ultimate destiny of Soviet "new thinking": glasnost,
perestroika, and "defensive defense" /"reasonable sufficiency," but questions
of a new world order and a system of international law, with a potency
heretofore thought merely idealistic, appear to be increasingly viable
possibilities. The coordinated action of the permanent members of the
United Nations (UN) Security Council in response to the Iraqi invasion of
Kuwait supports this view. In addition to unprecedented military action
against Iraq and the imposition of the most comprehensive regime of
economic sanctions ever, U.N. progress on other issues, such as resolution of
the Cambodian conflict, is further testimony to the fact that the Cold War is
over. While the scope and longevity of this transformation are as yet unclear,
it is certain that a new paradigm for the international system is emerging
which fundamentally differs from the classic Cold War paradigm. The post-
Cold War era is upon us.
In order to be a successful player in the new system, America must clearly
define the new environment and her place within it. The current era will not
be known for what it is not much longer; it will soon be known for what it
evolves into, just as surely as Pax Britannica is known as Pax Britannica, not
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merely as the post-Napoleonic period. Whatever the outcome of the current
paradigm shift, the critical strategic decisions for the future of America must
be made against the backdrop of a completely new international
environment. The emergence of a new fundamental framework implies that
entrenched policy positions, initially established in a world order now
defunct, must be reevaluated to assess their potential applicability and utility
within the new system. Simply stated, old questions will need new answers.
One such strategic question now facing American national security
strategists is the future of the arms control process. Arms control has
traditionally been a complicated venture, due to complex technical issues of
verification and superpower defense calculus; negotiations with a counterpart
not bound by the constraints of an open society and free press; ratification
procedures which are unpredictably sensitive to world political events, the
power and influence of individual legislators; the domestic political
environment; and the image the administration desires to portray to the
public.
Today, the complexities of the arms control process can be thought of as
superimposed upon new and more complex dimensions of strategic decision
making. Although the U.S.-Soviet relationship is undeniably not the
confrontational one that existed in during the era which preceded SALT
negotiations, ratification of an agreement by the cognizant Soviet legislative
body (the Committee on Defense and State Security of the Supreme Soviet)
implies that a Soviet administration may become, in the near future, as
limited in controlling the ratification process as a U.S. presidential
administration. While the committee has not evolved into a truly
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independent body, analogous to congressional committees in the United
States, it certainly does not function as a mere rubber stamp for the Soviet
President. The possibility of the Soviet government trying to justify an
agreement to a skeptical legislature, analogous to the American experience
with SALT II, introduces an unprecedented, yet highly significant new
variable in arms control negotiation.53 Furthermore, far greater technical
complexity in arms control may be on the horizon, since the United States
and Soviet Union have moved beyond the era in which arms control was
concerned only with strategic nuclear systems. Whereas an Intermediate-
Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty, which eliminates theater nuclear
weapons (whose ranges are between 500 and 5500km)54 and chemical
weapons (CW) treaties are now in force, major problems remain which
jeopardize the recently signed Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE) treaty
and the long-sought (and still unfinished) Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty
(START). In addition to these negotiating fora, both the United States and
Soviet Union have openly discussed the framework for a possible CFE II and
START II (which envisages warhead reduction 25% below START I levels).
While counting rules and methodologies for comparing asymmetries in
strategic nuclear systems have, for better or worse, been institutionalized;
counting rules and evaluating "offsetting asymmetries" in newly evolving
53A credible examination of the SALT II debate can be found in Strobe Talbott, Endgame:
The Inside Story of SALT II. Harper and Row, New York: 1979. For the genesis of SALT I see
John Newhouse, Cold Dawn: The Story of SALT. Holt, Rinehart and Winston, New York: 1973.
54Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty. For annual assessment of treaty
compliance and issues of interest relating to the treaty see United States Arms Control and
Disarmament Agency's annual report to Congress.
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realms of arms control have yet to be fully defined, compared and debated. It
can be postulated that "offsetting asymmetries" is entering an infinitely more
complex definitional era than has existed previously. How, for instance, does
one trade asymmetries in strategic arms for conventional arms, conventional
land forces for conventional naval forces, strategic offensive systems for
strategic defensive systems, conventional arms for chemical weaponry,
chemical for nuclear, etc.? The emergence of strategic defense technology and
the current "open skies" proposals highlight the specter of arms control in
space as well as for nuclear, chemical and conventional systems in the
terrestrial environment. It is clear that the current U.S.-Soviet arms control
agenda is more lengthy and complex than at any time in the history of the
relationship.
B. IS GORBACHEVS ARMS CONTROL FOR REAL?
It seems only to prudent to recognize the difficulties in the current arms
control regimes before conceptualizing new ones, especially ones which will
be conceived in a new international environment. Verification and
compliance55 concerns have not disappeared along with the crumbling of the
Berlin Wall, or even Soviet admission that the Krasnoyarsk radar was indeed
a violation of the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty.
55The Reagan administration made it a point to differentiate between verification and
compliance, indicating that compliance was the critical goal. What good, the administration
argued, is the ability to verify a treaty if a violation could not be made public without
compromising the means of verification. Such cases, (of which many existed) resulted in the
inability to translate treaty violation data into future treaty compliance. Compliance, then,
rather than verification, had to become the benchmark of acceptability.
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After the initial euphoria over the completion and signing of a CFE
Treaty, contentious issues are surfacing with regard to Soviet redesignation of
units to preclude them from aggregate Treaty Limiting Equipment (TLE) force
levels, namely:
• Exclusion of Soviet land-based naval aircraft from their allowed total of
combat aircraft from the Atlantic to the Urals (ATTU).
• Exclusion of three motorized rifle divisions (transferred to the Soviet
Naval Infantry) which are outfitted with, among other systems, 800
modern tanks. Justification of such a force for "coastal defense"
purposes is highly questionable.56
This behavior is difficult to understand: why would the Soviets sacrifice
the political capital they bought with a willingness to engage in CFE
negotiations for a marginal quantity of naval force which is not geo-
strategically significant? These forces may have a limited operational role,
but clearly do not resurrect the potential for mounting a theater strategic
offensive at the group of fronts level of warfare (the classic planning scenario
for NATO-Warsaw Pact confrontation in Europe). The coalition of military
and conservative political forces in the Soviet Union are making a statement
through this action. The West must question the wisdom, however, of
negotiating with a partner who can not deliver in a consistent or reliable
manner.
CFE is not an isolated case in point. The INF Treaty is also one in which
there was a major disconnect between grandiose political rhetoric and actual
Soviet follow through. One of the principal selling points of the INF treaty
was that the zero-zero formula made it very difficult to cheat and easy to
56Rear Admiral Thomas A. Brooks, USN, Director of Naval Intelligence (DNI),
'Testimony Before the Seapower, Strategic, and Critical Materials Subcommittee of the House
Armed Services Committee on Intelligence Issues", March 7, 1991, pp. 17-18.
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verify.57 It is abundantly clear that the INF treaty can be easily circumvented,
in strategically significant ways, even in an era of glasnost. The relatively
small missiles can be covertly stockpiled, new weapons can be introduced to
cover the same target set but whose range parameters exclude it from INF
confines, etc. Debate concerning treaty circumvention turned from
theoretical objections to serious concern when the governments of East
Germany, Czechoslovakia and Bulgaria admitted that Soviet made SS-23
intermediate range missiles were deployed in their countries, following press
reports that such missile deployments had indeed occurred. Reportedly, 72
SS-23s were located in Czechoslovakia, 24 in Bulgaria and 24 in East
Germany.58 The Soviet Union's response to the situation has been to claim:
• The missiles were "dispatched" to Eastern European allies before the
INF Treaty was signed and and were therefore outside the jurisdiction
of the Soviet Union during treaty negotiation.59
57A thorough examination of arms control policy in the first Reagan term can be found in
Strobe Talbott, Deadly Gambits . Alfred A. Knopf, New York: 1984. The book recounts the
bureaucratic struggle between Richard Burt, Assistant Secretary of State for Politico-Military
Affairs (PM) and Richard Perle, Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security
Policy (ISP), the pointmen for competing schools of thought on arms control policy within the
administration. The author's characterization of the policy evolution has been viewed as more
sympathetic to the positions of Richard Burt and the State Department than the positions then
ascribed to Perle and the Defense Department.
58Bill Gertz, "Discovery of Soviet missiles sidetracks arms-control efforts". Washington
Times. 2 April 1990, p. 3.
59Solovyev, Colonel Vadim, "Dispatch to North America", Commentary on Radio
Moscow, in English, 2300 GMT 31 Mar 90 (FBIS-SOV-90-063, April 2, 1990, p. 7). The response of
the Czechoslovak government can be found in Vacek, General Miorslav, Czechoslovak Defense
Minister, National Press Conference, Prague, in English, 1345 GMT 11 APR 90 (FBIS-EEU-90-
071, April 12, 1990, p.7) and in Kornilov, L., "The Republic Has a New Name", Izvestia. in
Russian, morning edition, March 31, 1990, p. 4 (FBIS-SOV-90-066, April 5, 1990, p. 36). The
response of the Bulgarian government is available in an Interview with Lieutenant General
Radnyu Minchev, spokesman of the Ministry of Defense and First Deputy Chief of the General
Staff of the Bulgarian People's Army, by Senior Lieutenant Krasimir Uzunov, Sofia Narodna
Armiya. in Bulgarian, April 11, 1990, p. 4 (FBIS-EEU-90-072, April 13, 1990, p. 3). The
justification used by the Eastern European nations is the same as given by the Soviets.
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• "All OTR-23's (SS-23s) that were at the Soviet Union's disposal have
been scrapped under the control of the American commission set up in
compliance of the treaty."60
• "Manufacture of such missiles has stopped, which too has been
checked by the U.S. Commission supervising the production process at
the missile assembly plant in Votkinsk."61
• "...The sole existing OTR-23's are the property of the GDR,
Czechoslovakia, and Bulgaria respectively, and it's up to these
countries to decide what to do with their missiles. The East German
Government, for one, has decided to scrap them."62
• "...All of the OTR-23's are equipped with conventional, not nuclear
warheads.63
The prime reason for the dismay about the SS-23s is that during the INF
negotiations U.S. negotiators sought assurances from the Soviets on 10
occasions that no INF missiles had been transferred to Warsaw Pact allies.
The Soviets responded in the negative on each occasion. An unnamed Bush
administration state department official is reported to have said, "If we had
known about these missiles before the [1987] treaty was signed, we would not
have recommended that Ronald Reagan sign it."64 A pentagon official, also
unnamed in the press, put it as follows: "This was a failure of intelligence and
a case of Soviet duplicity". The official said that "discovery of missiles







negotiations for the START and CFE treaties, which senior administration
officials had hoped to conclude this year."65 This assessment appears to have
been borne out by the results of the Bush-Gorbachev Summit in Washington
(June, 1990). In addition to Soviet concerns regarding German unification and
domestic political pressures on Gorbachev, American concerns over INF and
the future of the arms control process all appear to have contributed to the
slowed pace of START and CFE negotiations, resulting from the superpower
summit. The SS-23 case is sure to be an issue in the ratification effort of any
future arms control treaty, since the verification provisions of INF are the
model for potential verification regimes for START and CFE. The
provisions, heretofore thought nearly impossible to secure from the Soviet
Union, were intended to greatly enhance treaty verifiability, such that a
situation like that of the SS-23s would not occur. Fortunately, however, the
possibility of a repeat of the SS-23 situation is far less likely in emerging
Eastern European democracies than it was in the now defunct satellite states
of the Cold War era.
At this juncture, the critical implication of this issue is not SS-23 missile
characteristics, whether the possible violation was a result of Soviet duplicity
or mismanagement, the true orientation of emerging Eastern European
states, the degree of freedom of the press in these countries, or even the
65Ibid. The SS-23 incident may allow Sen Jesse Helms (R-NC), one of the few prominent
congressional critics of the INF treaty, to champion another look at the issue of "cover" Soviet
missiles. Sen Helms has called the INF treaty the "It's Not Finished Treaty" in his speeches
on the subject.
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inability of western intelligence to adequately monitor the agreement. The
critical implication is the wisdom of proceeding so quickly to complete an
entire package of arms control agreements in a period of revolutionary
change and uncertainty for the sake of political expediency.
Regardless of whether the INF treaty was violated, many senior officials
and defense specialists believe that the recent flurry of arms control progress
threatens to outstrip, in a fundamental way, the U.S. ability to monitor
existing agreements and those on the horizon. For example, Rear Admiral
Thomas Brooks, Director of Naval Intelligence (DNI) recently expressed
concern that the military services and defense department will be unable to
provide the requisite number of Russian linguists and other arms control
observers necessary just for verification of INF and START, not to mention
START II, CFE, CFE H, etc.66
International change and geo-political uncertainty have the potential to
force a redefinition of the objectives, rules and dangers lurking in the arms
control thicket. This has certainly been borne out in the slowdown on CFE
and START, which were nearly accepted as "done deals" less than one year
ago. The danger of rushing headlong to capture a moment of political
promise, despite the weight of evidence on "technical issues," is very real. A
fundamental reappraisal of the traditional arms control process (originally
created to meet the needs of a now defunct system of international relations)
66RADM Thomas Brooks, USN, Director, Naval Intelligence (DNI) briefing at the Naval
Postgraduate School, Monterey, Ca., January 17, 1990.
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must logically occur before lower order issues of agreement, execution and
implementation are considered.
C REFRAMING THE STRATEGIC CONTEXT FOR ARMS CONTROL
Having briefly reviewed some of the topical arms control obstacles, it is
worthwhile to recall the underlying philosophy for engaging in arms control
in the first place. Since the inception of U.S.-Soviet bilateral arms control (a
relatively recent development in the diplomatic history of agreements to
control armaments)67 an unquestioning commitment to strategic nuclear and
land based conventional arms control has become politically akin to loving
motherhood and apple pie. Commitment to the continuation of the process,
was, in the opinion of some, more important than the final results produced
by the process, or whether the process really furthered the initial objectives at
all. 68 The arms control community reached a general consensus in the early
1960s that there were three basic goals of arms control:
• Reduce the Likelihood of War—Arms control should reduce military
capabilities and therefore reduce fear of an enemy's first strike.
• Reduce the Consequences of War—Arms control should reduce the
the damage inflicted should war occur due to the reduced stockpile of
weapons or limited availability of weapons.
67See James L. George, Negotiating Naval Arms Control in Multilateral Fora.,
Presentation to the Naval Arms Limitation and Maritime Security Conference, sponsored by
the Center for Foreign Policy Studies, Dalhousie University, Halifax, Nova Scotia, 27 June
1990.
68 See Strobe Talbott, Deadly Gambits . The Reagan administration was unusual since it
began with unabashed disenchantment with the products of the process, and therefore, with
the arms control process itself.
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• Reduce the Cost of National Defense—Arms control should reduce the
cost of national defense since limitations on weaponry, personnel,
and/or operations would result in budget savings.69
Since the time these goals were articulated and generally accepted, the
evolution of the arms control process can be depicted pictorially as three
overlapping circles, each of which represents a distinct realm within the arms
control umbrella (see Figure 1). Each circle defines a distinct methodology
and theoretical construct for achieving the aims of arms control. From these
different conceptual approaches flow differing policy alternatives associated
with their implementation.
69For example, see a 1961 pathbreaking book by Thomas C. Shelling and Morton Halperin,
Strategy and Arms Control. Washington, D.C.: Pergamon, 1985 reprint, p. 1; U.S. Arms Control
and Disarmament Agency. Arms Control. 1979, Publication 104 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. ACDA,
1980) and U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, Arms Control Report (Washington,
D.C.: U.S. ACDA, 1976), p. 3. For application of these goals in the naval context see James J.
Tritten " "Naval" Arms Control: A Poor Choice of Words and an Idea Whose Time Has Yet to
Come". Current Research on Peace and Violence, Tampere Peace Research Institute, Tampere
Finland, Vol XIII, No. 2, 1990, p. 65.
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Figure 1. Alternative Methodologies for Arms Control Objectives
[Source: the author and Dr. Eric Grove]
It is important to note at the outset that one of the circles, under the
broader aegis of arms control, is itself labeled "Arms Control" and is therefore
not typologically precise since it represents one distinct path (or subset) for
arms control. This specific path is no more or less valid than the competing
paths depicted by the other two circles. The "Arms Control" approach has
become incorrectly synonymous with the entire process. This realm, more
accurately described as "arsenal balance," "offsetting asymmetries" or
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"balancing asymmetries", represents the policy route which has dominated
the superpower relationship since the 1972 SALT I and Anti-Ballistic Missile
System (ABM) agreements. One of the initial observations which can be
made from Figure 1 is that the orientation of the U.S.-Soviet arms control
relationship, characterized by SALT and START, is not the only option for
future progress and is not the only precedent which has met with some
degree of success. In fact, the fundamental change in security strategy,
spawned by the democratic watershed of 1989, logically implies that
fundamentally different methodologies will need to be explored.70
Eric Grove of the Foundation for International Security, argues quite
convincingly that the overlapping circles which depict competing arms
control methodologies are quickly evolving into a confused collage, devoid of
strategic coherence. It is imperative, however, to appreciate the differences
represented by each sphere and recognize the policy implications associated
with these differences. The three circles represent competing strategies of
achieving the principle aim of arms control: namely, the preservation of
national security through international military stability. 71 The
methodologies can be described as follows:
70 See George, for instance.
71 Dr. Eric Grove, Foundation for International Security, Adderbury, United Kingdom,
Epilogue Address, "Signalling Intentions, Limiting Capabilities and Maintaining Security-A
Fine Line?" for the Naval Arms Limitations and Maritime Security Conference, (sponsored by
the Center for Foreign Policy Studies, Dalhousie University) Halifax, Nova Scotia, 26-28 June
1990. In Dr. Grove's typology, each circle is a metaphorical realm whose objective is stability.
I define the real objective of arms control in the current era to be national security through
international military stability, rather than just stability itself. While these terms have
become fuzzy during the Cold War, it is appropriate in the post-Cold War era to think through
them anew. Is stability between the US and USSR vital in an era in which the USSR could
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Disarmament— Security and stability are functions of force quantity.
Lower force levels mean lower risks, consequences, and costs.
Disarmament can be achieved through unilateral, bilateral, and/or
multilateral means.
"Arms Control"— Security and stability are functions of arsenal
balance. This is the methodology, more accurately denoted as arsenal
balance or arms limitation, which has dominated the U.S.-Soviet arms
control relationship since the inception of the SALT process. If
quantities of force can't be reduced, then balanced (or equal) levels of
force are deemed more stable than unconstrained or unbalanced ones.
Since the military arsenals of sovereign nations have different
compositions, formulas for absolute equality are impossible.
Therefore, stability can be fostered by attempting to balance the
inherent asymmetries existing between the parties.
Confidence Building Measures—Security and stability are functions of
political predictability and military transparency. Predictability of a
potential adversary's actions and intentions is the critical factor for
security, regardless of force quantity or force balance. Predictability,
although perhaps bolstered by constrained force levels, is actually
acquired through military transparency, namely the acquisition of
information via formal communications and/or through the inertia of
experience accrued during a relationship (i.e. the relationship's
history).72
cease to be a superpower? Adherence to the concept of stability implies that the US must also
become weak to preserve the balance. National security, not stability itself, has historically
been the dominant theme in global politics since the Treaty of Westphalia and will remain so
in an international order of sovereign nation-states. Through the Cold-War experience, the
goal of strategic stability between nuclear superpowers, each of whom represent opposing
ideological camps, became entrenched. It need not always be so. The Bush-Gorbachev Summit
in Helsinki, (September 1990) stimulated by the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait raises the specter
that military stability (i.e. stability through balanced force levels) may not be absolutely
essential in the Post-Cold War world. Can the world be stable if Germany, India, or China, for
example, fields a larger army than the Soviet Union or United States? Ultimately,
international military stability need not be the guarantor of national security. Perhaps, in the
words of President Bush, the rule of law (via the UN) will replace the law of the jungle
(military force). The philosophy of US arms control policy should be to encourage the
transition, without leaving our nation exposed to the many threats to it's survival which will
continue to exist for a lengthy period.
^Author's adaptation of the Grove presentation.
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In addition to suggesting that there are other paths to the goals of arms
control other than through force level caps and balances, it is equally
important to appreciate that the three methodologies, distinct and separate in
theory, are in fact related and exhibit important common characteristics,
pictorially represented as areas of overlap. For instance, the INF Treaty not
only dictated balanced force levels or a SALT type building cap, it actually
reduced existing operational forces (in this case, intermediate range nuclear
systems). Reduction, rather than the previous and politically more modest
goal of limitation, was the policy of the Reagan administration and was the
underlying philosophy which necessitated rejection of the SALT precedent in
favor of START and INF.73 The INF Treaty, then, conceptually exists in the
overlap area between the "arms control" circle and the "disarmament" circle.
It could also be argued that a significant degree of confidence is gained from
enhanced on-site inspections (OSI), intelligence gathering and personnel
contacts, thereby conceptually locating the treaty in the overlap area shared by
each of the three metaphorical circles. Not only should the "arms
control" /(arsenal balance/building cap) regimes be reevaluated through the
typology of Figure 1, but other arms control precedents should also be
reviewed as well. The oft-cited 1963 "Hot Line" agreement is solely a
Confidence Building Measure (CSBM), while the Limited Test Ban Treaty
(LTB), Outer Space Treaty (OST), Seabed Arms Control Treaty (SACT), etc.
would most closely fit into the overlap between between "arms control"
73See Strobe Talbott, Endgame: The Inside Story of SALT II . Harper and Row, New
York.:1979, The Russians and Reagan. Random House, New York.: 1894, and Deadly Gambits .
Alfred A. Knopf, New York: 1984.
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(arsenal balance/building cap) and CSBMs. If the model could be
conveniently depicted in three dimensions, the aforementioned
"environmental" agreements would exist in the "arms control"/CSBM
overlap, on a recessed dimensional plane representing environmental impact
concerns. These examples are intended to provide an illustrative
demonstration of the content potential of the arms control model which has
been introduced. It is not intended to be comprehensive.
It is only through a framework of desired outcome objectives (such as that
which is presented here) that examination of potential future arms control
regimes can be intelligently made, rather than upon an extrapolation of the
entrenched Cold War precedent. One such issue is so-called "naval arms
control". This catch all term, like similar generic terms for nuclear arms
control or conventional arms control, encompasses proposals for
disarmament, "arms control" (arsenal balance/building cap), operational
restrictions and CSBMs.
D. THE NAVAL ROLE IN POST-COLD WAR ARMS CONTROL
With the Cold-War over, naval arms control (like many other well
entrenched Cold War "non-starters") is being reexamined. Who could have
predicted even a year ago that Marshall Sergei Akhromeyev, senior arms
control advisor to President Mikhail S. Gorbachev, would testify as an expert
witness before the United States Senate. 74 Is the climate for naval arms
74 See Marshall Sergei Akhromeyev, senior arms control Advisor to President Mikhail S.
Gorbachev, testimony before the Subcommittee on Projection of Forces and Regional Defense,
Committee on Armed Services, "Toward the Banning and Complete Elimination of Tactical
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control (consisting of either CSBMs, restrictions on operations, or limitations
in force structure or technology) conducive to an agreement that could
enhance mutual interests? Rather than examine these questions in a
maritime vacuum, which is frequently done, it is imperative to put the
question back into it's strategic context, subordinating it to higher order
political and military questions. Naval arms control should be approached,
in simplest terms as a third order policy question, or as a fourth or fifth order
question if a more rigorously analogous typology is adopted. The simplest
way to view naval arms control, within a coherent context for national
security, is as the third step in a three step hierarchical model of policy
formulation (Figure 2).
Figure 2 presents a cognitive map which depicts the relationship between
ends and means in a logical "top-down" methodology similar to the classical
Soviet approach to strategic planning.75 Historically, the United States has
Nuclear Weapons of the Soviet Union and the USA Naval Forces. About the Problem of
Negotiations of Naval Forces of these Countries, [sic]", May 8, 1980.
75Theoretically, there are four conceptual approaches to national strategic planning,
which depend upon how one desires to begin the policy formulation process The process can
begin with:
1. Identification of broad national objectives/goals
2. Identification and assessment of a threat to the nation
3. Estimate of national resources that will be made available for specific purposes
4. Recognition of the distribution of bureaucratic power within governments (to be
followed by a plan of action which will promote a distribution favorable to a particular world
view).
Clearly, combinations of these approaches are used in national strategic planning. Few
would argue, however, that the United States is not as comfortable with an approach beginning
with goals and objectives as with other methods. The Soviet Union and Soviet military in




What will be the new identity of the United States in
the post-Cold War era and what role will the United
States assume in a changed world order?
I
SECOND ORDER QUESTION:
What conceptual framework will be adopted to
determine the formulation of policy and the
prioritization of United States' National Security
Strategy in the post-Cold War era?
I
THIRD ORDER QUESTION:
What composition of defense doctrine, military asset
types, asset quantities, budget strategy and
INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS will be chosen to execute
post-Cold War National Security Strategy?
Figure 2. A Three-step Cognitive Flow Chart for Evaluation of Naval Arms
Control Policy
(Source: the author)
been prone to approaching strategic planning based upon external threats (e.g.
communism, Naziism, "the yellow peril", terrorism, etc.) and upon resource
availability trends. 76 While resource availability concerns are increasingly
76Changes in the defense budget are most often argued in terms of dollar percent increases
or decreases from previous years and previous administrations. See, for example, William W.
Kaufman and Laurance J. Korb, The 1990 Defense Budget . The Brookings Institution,
Washington D.C.: 1989. An account of how the Reagan defense spending levels were derived
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important to ascertain, the dramatic political metamorphoses in the Soviet
Union has made planning based upon "the threat" less credible and therefore
less politically significant. An underlying theme to be stressed is that the
United States government, and the administration in particular, will be
required to do more strategic planning based upon goals and objectives if a
degeneration into purely political budget politics, devoid of sense and
purpose, is to be avoided. Avoiding such a condition is both necessary and
desirable if naval arms control or any other policy question is to be
responsibly integrated into the U.S. national interest, consistent with the
dynamic nature of today's world.
Figure 2 depicts that the first order question addresses the very
orientation the United States chooses for itself in the post-Cold War era. This
is not a merely academic question, but the principal dilemma faced by policy
makers and politicians. Does the United States still want to be "the leader of
the free world"? Would it be preferable to be one of a new set of co-equal
great powers along with the EEC and Japan?77 Perhaps the American body
politic will opt to philosophically turn inward, devoting the vast majority of
available resources to domestic challenges, such as drugs, the environment,
the educational system, health care, the Savings and Loan (S and L) bailout,
the national transportation system, civilian applications of research and
development, homelessness, etc. In addition to the uncertainty of the Soviet
from the previous Carter budgets is presented in David Stockman, The Triumph of Politics:
Why the Reagan Revolution Failed . Harper and Row, New York.: 1986, (pp. 105-109, etc.).
77This could resemble the pre-World War I balance-of-power formula in Europe with the
important difference that economic power, rather than military strength, would function as the
currency of international power.
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Union's future, the evolution of a "modern" China, India, the Middle-East,
Latin America, and Africa contribute to the uncertainty which surrounds the
emerging environment. It is clear that a multi-track strategy must be adopted
because of the wildly divergent possibilities inherent in the emerging
international paradigm. In the academic literature of strategic planning, four
works postulate perspectives and methods which provide a suitable
framework for analysis of arms control alternatives (due to the breadth, scope,
and flexibility of the models): Ascher and Overholt's Strategic Planning and
Forecasting, Barry Blechman's U.S. Security in the 21st Century, Charles W.
Taylor's Alternative World Scenarios For Strategic Planning and "The
Planning Framework Project" prepared by The Center For Naval Analysis.78
The model advocated by Ascher and Overholt requires the identification
of three levels of strategy: core, basic, and hedging. The core strategy
represents constant elements which will be prevalent in all future
environments, basic strategy represents the elements of the most likely future
environment, and hedging strategies represent elements which are included
to "hedge" against the less likely environments. The composite strategy
which is the final product of this process will be very sound, assuming, of
course, that the chosen alternatives were thorough, clear and flexible at their
78William Ascher and William Overholt, Strategic Planning and Forecasting . New York:
John Wiley and Sons, 1983, Barry M. Blechman, U.S. Security in the 21st Century . Boulder, Co.:
Westview Press, 1987, Charles W. Taylor, Alternative World Scenarios For Strategic Planning .
Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania.: 1988,
and James R. Blaker et al., "The Planning Framework Project", Strategic Policy Analysis Group
(SPAG), The Center For Naval Analysis, 1990. For a more recent utilization of these themes see
The Center for Strategic and International Studies' work "Regional Force Structure
Alternatives", excerpted from U.S. Conventional Force Structure at a Crossroads, Washington,
DC: 1985.
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conception. 79 Taylor postulates four major scenarios which are representative
and interesting:
Scenario A— U.S. as an Isolationist Nation—The U.S. turns inward
and disengages from as many international responsibilities as possible.
According to Taylor, this is the most probable alternative in terms of
American history, American culture, current political forces, etc. (The
reference to American history applies to the full continuum of
American history, of which the Cold War was an aberration.) A
prefacing indicator of this scenario would be major economic
protectionism.
It is interesting to note that this scenario is the preference of a newly
emerging group of power players (within congress and the media) of
both the left and right. Isolationism and international economic
hardball are the key themes of: House Majority Whip Richard Gephardt
(D-Mo) (used extensively in his 1988 presidential campaign), populist
Congressman James Traficant (D-Oh), House Minority Whip Newt
Gingrich (R-Ga) and Pat Buchanan (syndicated columnist and former
speech writer in the Nixon and Reagan administrations).
Scenario B— U.S. as the Fulcrum Actor— The U.S. determines that
it's national interest is best served by maintaining an international
posture in which the U.S. is actively engaged in the international system.
This scenario postulates a world in which there are three centers of
power:
• North America (the U.S. and Canada acting in concert, regardless of the
closeness and formality of political union)
• Europe
• Japan (possibly with Asian allies/economic partners such as Korea, the
Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN)), etc.
The U.S. role would be similar to that of Great Britain in the period
1815-1914, namely a fulcrum actor whose foreign policy posture is
flexible enough to shift the balance of power, when desired, among
nations or power blocs in order to advance long term national interests.
This strategy would encourage the formation of short term alliances (or
alliances designed for specific, limited purposes) rather than the long
' 9Ascher and Overholt, pp. 21-41.
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term alliances of Cold War vintage. Although circumstances have
changed significantly, this scenario is certainly reminiscent of the advice
from George Washington's farewell address—avoid "entangling
alliances."
This scenario is clearly the preference of President Bush and his
administration and it serves as the basis for the structure of the new
national security strategy.
Scenario C—World of Neo-Nationalism— Nationalism resurges
with greater intensity in the aftermath of the Cold War. Likely
candidates for autonomy, self determination and/or more voice in the
world community are: various Soviet nationalities/republics, Central
European nations, pan-Arabism, India, China, the Philippines, Latin
America and African nations. This scenario is highly unstable and
potentially very dangerous. One possible outgrowth of this system is an
increased possibility of civil wars of ethnic nationalism (e.g. Hispanic
America). Another possibility is a resurgence of national enmity, similar
to the atmosphere that preceded the world wars.
Scenario D—Aggressor Denial— One nation becomes identified as a
common threat to international security; historical precedents include
opposition to Napoleon, Soviet expansion, etc. This scenario is as likely
as any, as it represents the current version of a historically constant
phenomenon; it is significantly easier to muster the national will to
oppose something tangible than it is to advocate an internal agenda to
promote elusive goals. The opposition to Saddam Hussein's Iraq is a
timely case in point.80
The next order of business (see Figure 2) is determination of the
conceptual framework that will be used to guide the formulation of policy
80 The description of the scenarios is the author's paraphrasing of the work of Charles
Taylor and commentary on that work by strategic planning theorist Dr. Frank M. Teti. The
current international situation has stimulated a great deal of fascinating literature on
alternative political futures. A few examples are: Charles W Taylor "The Alternative World
Scenarios: The Alpha Scenarios", Alternative World Scenarios for Strategic Planning ,
Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania, 1988
(future U.S. political /military posture), Perry M. Smith et al., Creating Strategic Vision.
National Defense University Press, Washington D.C., 1987 (application of alternative future
theory with respect to the "new" Soviet Union), and Takashi Inoguchi, "Four Japanese
scenarios for the future", International Affairs, London, Winter 1989, pp.1 5-28 (alternative
roles of Japan in the new world order).
55
and the prioritization of post-Cold War national security strategy (the second
order question). To operationalize this step, the administration must develop
a coherent synthesis of the different approaches to strategic planning in order
to further the ideals of the American identity in a dynamic international
system. 81 Clearly, a "given" in the current domestic political debate is that
U.S. resources are indeed limited: difficult prioritizing must take place, and
the American public is not enthusiastic about current military spending
levels or convinced that they are necessary (it will be interesting to see how
much, if at all, the Gulf War ultimately affects this trend). There are
important alternatives for the composition of national power, regardless of
the ultimate destiny of the Soviet Union. For instance, if the United States
intends to be the predominant world power and "fulcrum actor", it may opt
to retain a military capability only slightly less great than it possesses today,82
or it may reason that redirection of those resources into the civilian sector
will be more efficacious, and that the military need only be large enough to
prevail, with likely coalition allies, against likely adversaries. Simply stated,
the government must reach consensus on the optimum mix of resource
instruments of national power best suited to pursue national security and
fulfill the vision of a national identity. Since Gorbachev was able to base his
81This vision needs to be described and operationalized at every possible interface node
which connects the administration with the public (president's national security strategy
document, State of the Union and inaugural speeches, press conferences, testimony of
administration officials before congress, etc.)
82Clearly, it will be difficult to sell Congress the idea that the same basic force structure,
justified by the Soviet threat, is nearly the same as what is needed in the post-Cold War
world. Unfortunately for the Navy, this difficult case is, probably, legitimate because of an
underestimation of the non-Soviet threats in the past.
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country's security future on a concept less dependent upon military means
than before, it will be very difficult for the United States not to adapt in kind,
regardless of important geo-strategic reasons which mitigate against
emulating the Soviet course.
Third, a consensus will need to emerge which incorporates a combination
of defense doctrine, military asset types, asset quantities, budget strategy and
international agreements designed to facilitate the national security strategy.
To illustrate:
• Changes in defense doctrine can result in dramatic force level
multiplication!division—The Soviet Union will require far less
military hardware and personnel if they pursue "defensive defense"
than if they desired to retain a defense based upon preemptive strike
and the capability to assume the strategic offensive at the theater/group
of fronts level of warfare (therefore, "defensive defense" is, in theory, a
force divider). The U.S. maritime strategy was a defense doctrine
adopted as a force multiplier since mission objectives could not
otherwise be fulfilled with existing force levels and anticipated
procurement.83
• Differences in various combinations of asset types/asset quantities are
significant—If, for example, a squadron of B-2 bombers can accomplish
the mission of an entire wing of B-52s, the huge procurement costs
may be more cost effective than the maintenance, training, and
personnel costs of the older system.84 "...As another example, we
invested heavily in applying the latest technology in the F-18 and the
Aegis cruiser to achieve mean times between failures 25 times higher
83This was the rationale used to justify the maritime strategy militarily. See John F.
Lehman Jr. Command of the Seas. Charles Scribner's Sons, New York: 1988 (chapter 4, etc).
Others have argued, with some evidence, that the maritime strategy's primary value was as a
budgetary justification tool. See, for example Robert Komer, Maritime Strategy or Coalition
Defense . Abt Books, Cambridge, MA.:1984. The comprehensive reference bibliography on this
subject is CAPT Peter Schwartz, USN and Jan S. Breemer, bibliographers (James J. Tritten,
principle investigator). The Maritime Strategy Debates: A Guide To The Renaissance of U.S.
Naval Strategic Thinking in the 1980s, Monterey, Ca.: Naval Postgraduate School
(Department of National Security Affairs), September, 1989.
^This is intended for illustrative purposes only.
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than the Phantom and the Chicago [sic] class cruiser they replaced.... In
the case of the Aegis cruiser, we have a ship at least 20 times more
capable than the ship it replaces and manned by only 350 officers and
men, compared to 1,150 for the older cruiser. Thus today, thanks to
high-tech and complexity, our latest fighters and ships are not only far
more capable but actually much less expensive to own and operate.85
• Budget strategy and international agreements are critical variables
which must be coherent—Trade-offs in service support for arms
treaties in exchange for congressional support for arms funding is a
well established precedent, especially in the SALT era.86 This was only
possible, however, because of the clout that the services exercised with
respect to waging the Cold War (i.e. the public's ideological fervor
during the cold war exceeded national resource expenditure concerns).
The current environment has changed 180 degrees; domestic programs
are becoming perceived as far more urgent on the national agenda than
international concerns (i.e. resource expenditure concerns exceed
international ideology in the public perception). Therefore, it should
be expected that the cause-and-effect support phenomenon vis-s-vis
arms control will be reversed; in the post-Cold War environment,
services which are not credible players domestically will be less
relevant in the treaty ratification process and can expect to also pay the
budget allocation price in an era of declining resources and perceived
reduction in the threat.
In order to take the analysis to the next step and apply the possible futures
concept to the design of a naval fleet, U.S. Security in the 21st Century87 offers
an excellent model. Barry Blechman projects an alternative strategic
environment matrix in which each of the world's geographic regions are
explored against a range of possible superpower futures.88 In order to be
^Lehman, pp. 155-6.
86A naval perspective can be found in Elmo R. Zumwalt, Jr, On Watch. Quadrangle, New
York.: 1976.




ultimately useful for naval purposes, the methodology which Blechman
advocates needs to be expanded and specialized. The process, however, is
ideally suited to an environment in which the future alignment of politico-
military "power blocs" is yet undetermined.
An outstanding blueprint for this extrapolation can be found in the
Maritime Balance Study of 1979. 89 The methodology employed is termed
"cellular analysis," a technique in which maritime missions (termed
"businesses"), geographic regions of maritime interest, and maritime strategic
competitive factors (e.g. C3I capabilities, availability of bases /logistic support,
etc.) are assessed in a three dimensional cell for synthesis and net assessment.
Admittedly, this study was designed with purely a bipolar focus (as was logical
in 1979). The enduring value of this approach, however, is the clear and
effective manner in which the factors critical to maritime success were
identified and operationalized. An expansion of this model to a multi-polar
focus, in which each of the designated "power blocs" are assessed against each
other, will enable the requirements for the future force structure to be
intelligently derived.90
890ffice of the Chief of Naval Operations, "The Maritime Balance Study-The Navy
Strategic Planning Experiment", 1979.
90This approach, based upon the Blechman model and the methodology employed in The
Maritime Balance Study, was used in a highly interesting way in group presentations
concerning the future security environment of the United States in NS3230 (Strategic Planning
and U.S. National Security Policy) taught by Professor Frank M. Teti at the Naval
Postgraduate School, summer quarter, 1989. In the presentations, a series of alternative power
bloc alignments were postulated:
• USA, USSR, EEC, CHINA, JAPAN
• USA/EEC, USSR, CHINA, JAPAN
• USA, USSR/EEC (common European home), CHINA, JAPAN
• USA, USSR/EEC, CHINA/JAPAN (Oriental PACRIM alliance)
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Figure 3 depicts the theoretical genesis of the post-Cold War Navy,
specific to it's particular role in the eventual military mix. The critical
question that this graphic highlights is the trade-off between designing a
naval policy with the most potent military role (zero sum game strategy
proper) and designing a naval policy which can best contribute to a robust
diplomatic/political cooperation strategy among key power blocs via a variety
of means, including a more robust arms control process (Figure 3).
Figure 4 depicts how acceptable naval arms control regimes could evolve.
The cognitive flow chart of Figure 4 depicts the most logical derivation of
these policy options, since it requires that the determination be made about
the appropriate role of the navy within the national military strategy as a
precursor to the political value of naval arms control. This logical approach
would, in theory, prevent "giving away the store" and could bring the Navy
bureaucracy on board, able to embrace a broad political and military agenda in
a cooperative way, thereby maximizing the value of the Navy to the nation at
large (see Figure 4).
Each of the potential power blocs were then assessed in terms of economic strength,
military capability, political structure, etc. Based upon a set of seemingly likely assumptions
(USA/USSR START agreement signed in the early 1990s, major withdrawals of NATO and
Warsaw Pact ground forces from Europe, etc.) a cross-impact matrix (CIPM) analysis of these
possibilities highlighted common "basic" strategies, possible areas of unforeseen growth
potential, and some common dilemmas which demand attention.
Another possibility which needs to be included in this analysis is:
• Cooperative USA/USSR relationship (arms control has increased potential in such an
environment due to the need to become better and more functionally acquainted).
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FIRST ORDER QUESTION:
What will be the new identity of the United States in
the post-Cold War era and what role will the United
States assume in a changed world order?
I
SECOND ORDER QUESTION:
What conceptual framework will be adopted to
determine the formulation of policy and the
prioritization of United States' National Security
Strategy in the post-Cold War era?
I
THIRD ORDER QUESTION:
What composition of defense doctrine, military asset
types and asset quantities will be deemed necessary
for post-Cold War defense policy and execution of
post-Cold War National Security Strategy?
T
FOURTH ORDER QUESTION:
What role and resource allocation level will be
assigned to the United States Navy to support the
post-Cold War National Security Strategy (i.e. how
significant a military role is envisaged for the Navy
vs. its potential to contribute to A
DIPLOMATIC/POLITICAL COOPERATION STRATEGY AMONG
KEY POWER BLOCS VIA A MORE ROBUST ARMS CONTROL
PROCESS?




The Navy bureaucracy will never be brought on board if its military value
and institutional survival are in question—and that is totally understandable.
If the budget is "in free fall, however, with no end in sight"91 , who can blame
the Navy for being sensitive to the possibility of an arms control "slippery
slope"?
91 Admiral Carlisle A.H. Trost, Navy Chief of Naval Operations, Superintendent's Guest
Lecture presented at the Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, Ca., May 8, 1990.
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FIRST ORDER QUESTION:
What will be the new identity of the United States in
the post-Cold War era and what role will the United
States assume in a changed world order?
t
SECOND ORDER QUESTION:
What conceptual framework will be adopted to
determine the formulation of policy and the
prioritization of United States' National Security
Strategy in the post-Cold War era?
t
THIRD ORDER QUESTION:
What composition of defense doctrine, military asset
types and asset quantities will be deemed necessary to
execute post-Cold War National Security Strategy?
t
FOURTH ORDER QUESTION:
What role and resource allocation level will be
assigned to the United States Navy to support the




What types of Naval Arms Control regimes could
potentially support the naval component of the
post-Cold War National Security Strategy and other
national interests of the United States?




IV. A NEW AGENDA FOR POST-COLD WAR NAVAL ARMS CONTROL
POLICY92
Now is the time to synthesize the cognitive, philosophical approach to
naval arms control with a practical agenda for the future. It is in the best
interests of the Navy to have thought through such an agenda in-house, so it
can drive the coming policy debate and not be relegated to spectator status
while Congress and OSD debate the Navy's future. Since naval arms control
must be viewed in a national strategic context, it is necessary to ensure that
any proposed arms control agenda is consistent with the broad outlines of the
new national security strategy.
A. BASIC TENETS OF THE NEW NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY
The Bush administration is to be commended for it's efforts to date,
namely in presenting a strawman proposal to Congress which is credible,
realistic and consistent with emerging priorities of the post-Cold War
national agenda (especially the need to redirect resources from defense
programs to the domestic sector). It was unveiled on August 2, 1990,
ironically the same day as another international watershed event: namely the
Iraqi invasion of Kuwait. The Strategy is official recognition of the consensus
92The sections of this chapter which deal with specific components and force mix of the
new national security strategy draw heavily upon James J. Tritten. "America Promises To Come
Back: A New National Strategy". Monterey, Ca.: Naval Postgraduate School (Department of
National Security Affairs) technical report NPS-NS-91-003A prepared for the Defense
Nuclear Agency; Defense Policy Office (National Security Council Staff); and Net Assessment
and Competitive Strategies Office and Strategic Planning Branch, Office of the Secretary of
Defense, May 13, 1991. (forthcoming in July edition of Security Studies ). Dr. Tritten's
examination of the Strategy is the pathbreaking analysis of the subject.
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first priority for the national agenda: major reduction in defense spending
levels to contribute to deficit reduction. The Strategy is based upon the
implicit need to reduce both defense expenditures and military personnel
levels. The Bush plan proposes that expenditures and personnel be cut by
25% each. The Aspen speech was merely the opening volley in what is sure to
be an interesting political process of consensus building.
The Strategy announced in the President's speech has been enumerated
further and additional options for implementation have been discussed in a
series of speeches, articles, and reports that must be examined, in the order of
their appearance, to fully understand the evolution of the Strategy and where
it stands today.93





A "base force", consisting of four military components, was proposed to
execute the strategy:




93See James J. Tritten. "America Promises To Come Back: A New National Strategy".
Monterey, Ca.: Naval Postgraduate School (Department of National Security Affairs)
technical report NPS-NS-91-003A prepared for the Defense Nuclear Agency; Defense Policy
Office (National Security Council Staff); and Net Assessment and Competitive Strategies
Office and Strategic Planning Branch, Office of the Secretary of Defense, May 13, 1991, pp. 3-9.
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The strategy calls for the ability to respond to crises that can be described as
slow-building, fast-rising, imminent conflict, and conflict94 and for the




• Research and Development (R & D)
B. CRITICAL ASSUMPTIONS OF THE NEW STRATEGY
Programming for the strategy is predicated upon the assumption that the
Soviet Union could not launch the classic theater strategic offensive
operation at the group of fronts level without a two-year reconstitution
period which could be used as warning time for the West to reconstitute a
defensive force. Specifically, this implies that a conventional force parity will
exist in Europe from the Atlantic to the Urals, all Soviet ground and air forces
will withdraw from former Warsaw Pact host nations and return inside
Soviet borders, and that the Soviet Union's internal problems will prevent it
from executing expansionist operations. General Powell has stated that
ratification of the CFE treaty is necessary to meet these conditions. If trends in
the Soviet Union change significantly, Secretary Cheney has stated that he
and the CJCS reserve the right to come back to Congress and recommend that
the 25% reduction of the US military not proceed on schedule because the
aforementioned assumptions for the strategic environment will no longer be
valid.
94Joint Chiefs of Staff, 1991 Toint Military Net Assessment, March 1991.
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In lieu of such occurrence (and pending settlement of other critical
choices which have yet to be made95), navy force structure should not deviate
significantly from what is already being openly discussed and generally
accepted by the Secretary of the Navy and CNO (see Table 2, below):
The foundations of the new strategy, deterrence, forward presence, crisis
response, and collective security are missions which are natural and
traditional for naval forces. There is no reason for naval planners to assume
the worst—a robust navy will be important in the new world order and the
specter of naval arms control will not destroy the role of the U.S. Navy in
national security strategy.
C LIKELY CONGRESSIONAL TESTS FOR THE NEW STRATEGY
Will the Congress and the public at large ultimately support the new
strategy? When addressing identification of the critical tests for any national
policy, it is logical to start with the concept that national strategic planning in
a free society is based upon the values of the society at large, rather than upon
a detached agenda of a non-representative government.
95For example, will a true "can opener" capability be maintained to seize territory
occupied by a determined power, what will be the future role of the US in NATO, will NATO
fundamentally alter the strategy of flexible response, will NATO accept a formal role in out-
of-area-operations, etc.?
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TABLE 2. ANTICIPATED NAVAL FORCE STRUCTURE AND DISPOSITION
FOR THE 1990S
THE NAVY "BASE" FORCE
450 ship fleet (down from 545) of which approximately 30% is deployed
12 CVs (currently 14)—12 deployable (plus 1 trng)
Battleships
150 surface combatants
3 MEFs (160,000 personnel and amphibious lift for assault echelons of
2.5 MEBs)
STRATEGIC FORCES
Offensive-OHJO procurement will stop at 18 (not all units will be
retrofitted with Trident II D-5 SLBM)
Defensive-possible procurement of a sea-borne GPALs system. System
basing could theoretically occur on platforms of all three warfighting
communities (SSBN missile tubes, fixed wing carrier air, or "Super
Aegis" equipped surface ships)96
ATLANTIC FORCES
Residual Forward Deployed Force—1 CVBG/1 ARG
Reinforcing Home Based Force—5 CVBGs/1 MEB (plus a marine
reserve component)
PACIFIC FORCES
Residual Forward Deployed Force—1 CVBG (Japan) /l ARG




probable Navy contribution limited to
a contingent of special forces along with some contribution of
transportation and infrastructure capability.
Forces Dedicated for Temporary Operations—Existing Atlantic and
Pacific Units likely to be "chopped" to the contingency force, when
required.
(Source: the author)
^This course of action would be precluded by the ABM Treaty and would require treaty
modification/abrogation.
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While certainly oversimplified, the public supported a fully engaged
United States foreign policy during the Cold War to contain Communist
expansion and was generally willing to accept the opportunity costs of Cold
War military spending levels (most objections in mainstream America and
in Congress were relatively marginal in nature). Two vastly different, but
nonetheless significant watershed phenomenons radically transformed the
paradigm:
• Defense Procurement Scandals in the Reagan Administration and
• The "Gorbachev Phenomenon"
Among the defense procurement scandals of the Reagan administration,
none caused more embarrassment than the revelation of the exorbitant prices
that the government was paying for such items as coffee pots, hammers, and
toilet seats.97 These seemingly outrageous expenditures caused more public
outcry than procurement scandals relating to major acquisition contracts for
big ticket items. When the dust settled, the public seemed to appreciate that
these problems were not the result of deliberate attempts to defraud the
taxpayers, but nonetheless retained the conviction that there must be a more
responsible way to run "the system". Ultimately, though, the public had to
admit that these problems were relatively more palatable than leaving the
West vulnerable to the Soviet "Evil Empire" by gutting the defense budget.
The Gorbachev phenomenon redistributed a huge weight from the delicately
balanced scale of American public opinion on defense spending levels. After
the initial euphoria (followed by a short period of skepticism to see if
97Lawrence J. Korb, Address to the Naval War College, November 13, 1988.
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Gorbachev was really a wolf in sheep's clothing) the government and the
public could plainly see that with the dismantling of the Berlin Wall, the
strategic situation in the world had dramatically changed.
The voting public's consensus vis-a-vis the worldwide containment of
Communism disintegrated, and more attention was given to the new
consensus items for the national agenda. These items were destined to
become building blocks for the security strategy of a free society, namely:
• Status of the National Economy (especially the budget deficit)
• Concern for the Environment
• Emphasis on Education Opportunities
• Concern for "humanitarian issues" (e.g., homelessness, health care,
poverty, etc.)98
The Congress will be the ultimate judge of the soundness of the new
national security strategy. It is sure to at least focus attention on the strategy's
ability to meet the following basic tests of contextual appropriateness,
identified by the author:
1. Does it responsibly address resource constraints, i.e. will the amount of
defense spending decrease be deemed sufficient, responsible, and well
managed?
2. Does it provide for a residual military force which is highly flexible and
mobile, i.e. does it provide for a force that can operate in a modern,
high technology battlefield anywhere in the world?
3. Does it seek to responsibly deal with weapons of mass destruction in
order that it is responsive to public concern and the change in the
international environment, i.e. does it seek to limit the number and
role of these weapons to the lowest possible level required to support
national strategy?
98The author's representation of the public's assessment of domestic priorities as taken
from various public opinion polls carried by the media.
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4. Does it encourage the development of military officers who are "joint"
qualified warrior/statesmen (in the spirit of the Goldwater-Nichols
Defense Reorganization Act)?
5. Does it have a positive influence on environmental concerns, i.e. does
it provide for enhanced environmental protection/clean-up?
6. Does it allow for a sufficient US military role in appropriate
international causes, especially with regard to humanitarian relief
efforts?"
The natural question at this point in the analysis is: How does naval arms
control fit into these tests for the new strategy? Instead of viewing arms
control as a process with an independent inertia and agenda, the process must
be regularly reappraised to assess its applicability in the current environment.
Even though naval arms control is a FIFTH ORDER QUESTION (which
logically awaits the complete answering of the previous four), certain
planning assumptions can be made which permit the staffing out of potential
naval arms control regimes which are consistent with the emerging
environment. The Bush administration is clearly committed to pursuing a
world order in which the United States assumes the role of fulcrum actor (see
chapter three). The Navy remains a critical national instrument in this
construct and will emerge from restructuring relatively better than the other
services. It is the fifth order question, then, which must ultimately be planned
for; what types of naval arms control regimes could potentially support the
naval component of the post-Cold War national security strategy and other
national interests of the United States (see Figure 4).
"Author's assessment of critical tests.
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D. AUTHOR'S RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FUTURE NAVAL ARMS
CONTROL POLICY
In order to evaluate the current status of naval arms control, Table 3
(below) provides a snapshot reference for assessment of the various
proposals. The table categorizes naval arms control alternatives, (whether
currently in force or just proposed in the literature) by the postulated
enforcement mechanism: negotiated treaty100 , executive agreement,
unilateral action, or none (i.e. not appropriate for the arms control process).
Table 3 and the supporting text describe my typology of US participation in
naval arms control to date and serves to depict my policy recommendations
for the future. My recommendations are based upon the premise that future
US naval arms control policy should fully support and compliment the new
national security strategy and meet the likely tests of congressional acceptance
of the strategy (listed above).
Tests one and two require that the strategy responsibly account for
resource constraints while leaving a residual force whose combat capability is
suited to the new international environment. Congressional reaction to date
has been favorable and the imminent reduction in naval force structure (as
postulated in Table 2) has met little resistance thus far. With regard to
limitations on capability, there is no debate that reduction in total force
quantity (one "brand" of structural naval arms control) is already happening,
100por reference to the treaties which are germaine to each category see United States
Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, Arms Control and Disarmament Agreements (1990 ed.),
Washington DC, 1990.
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TABLE 3. CURRENT SNAPSHOT OF US NAVAL ARMS CONTROL



















Wpns of Mass Dest
Nuc Wpns Capability C C
Chm Wpns Capability C C
Bio Wpns Capability C C










Naval Exercises C C
Peacetime Deploymts C
Zones Of Peace C
Nuclear Free Zones N
Nuc Wpn Free Zones C P
ASW Free Zones N
SSBN Safe Havens N
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TABLE 3. CURRENT SNAPSHOT OF US NAVAL ARMS CONTROL
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unilaterally, as a result of budget actions and will continue as a result of the
new strategy. The US is reducing the quantity of nearly every facet of naval
power: submarine forces (SSBNS and SSNs), surface forces (including
elimination of the battleships), air power (aircraft carrier hulls and airwings),
amphibious forces, etc. (see Table 2). In fact, there is little debate about the
aggregate quantity of naval force structure which will emerge from the new
environment, only the type of political packaging which will ultimately
justify it. It is also clear that the Soviets are conducting unilateral naval force
reduction as well.
Arms control experience has demonstrated that intentions can change
relatively quickly, whereas force structure changes slowly. Therefore, the
process of structural arms control is predisposed to lagging the international
trends that it is designed to capture. During the inter-war period the naval
arms control process couldn't keep pace with rising international tensions
(and therefore may have exacerbated them). During the Cold War, the
superpower arms control process could also not keep pace with rising
international tensions. In today's environment, the superpower arms
control process (e.g. START and CFE) can not keep pace with receding
international tensions. This phenomenon occurs because the process of
structural arms control is slow, laborious, technically complicated, and
politically contentious. Since structural naval arms control is happening
unilaterally, via the "disarmament" model of arms control, it should not be
jeopardized by attempting to legislate it internationally, via the "arsenal
balance" model of arms control (see Figure 1). It should be noted that
unilateral arms control is not only theoretically valid, it is perhaps the most
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practical way to actually achieve the desired goals of arms control
(enumerated in chapter three). 101
In addition to total force structure issues, capability can also be bounded
through the limitation of weapons of mass destruction, the limitation on key
naval technologies, and naval resource limitation. Weapons of mass
destruction levels have always been of grave concern to the public, and this
concern can be expected to increase in the aftermath of the Persian Gulf War
and with future proliferation of these weapons. This concern is reflected in
test three for new the strategy. The limitation and control of weapons of mass
destruction is a problem which, although serious, does not need an additional
arms control solution. Kenneth Adelman correctly states, "Certainly a
primary role filled by the arms control process is to reassure the public that
somehow, someway, its government is grappling with the nuclear issue." 102
The Navy can and should make an even stronger defense of its role vis-a-
vis the national arsenal of weapons of mass destruction. The public and all
relevant government players should be reminded that the Navy is in sync
with the national agenda on this issue; the Navy does not possess, test, or
exercise with any chemical or biological weapon and is eliminating most
tactical nuclear weapons, unilaterally, without the interference of a treaty (as
indicated in the capability limitation section of Table 3). The absence of
chemical and biological weapons from naval forces is a unilateral policy and
101 Kenneth Adelman, Director, U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, "Arms




since the force levels are zero, the Navy is in automatic compliance with
governing international law, namely the Geneva Conventions and the 1972
Biological Weapons Convention.
Navy nuclear weapons are also being controlled both by unilateral action
and executive agreement. The Navy is eliminating most tactical nuclear
systems (ASROC, SUBROC, and Terrier BTN) unilaterally. The main theater
nuclear weapon the Navy will posses after tactical nuclear reduction is
nuclear SLCM, which is being controlled via agreements in conjunction with
START. Since nuclear SLCM is needed as a rapidly-returnable deterrent in
the European theater and elsewhere, its current status vis-a-vis the arms
control process is also appropriate. Navy strategic nuclear weapons (SSBMs)
are limited through SALT II (which is adhered to, although the formal treaty
was never ratified) and the START process. The Navy can also "take credit"
for participation in efforts to preclude nuclear proliferation from expanding
into the world's oceans (The Seabed Arms Control Treaty of 1971) and for the
limitation of nuclear testing (The Limited Test Ban Treaty of 1963).
The final serious means of capability limitation is through the control of
key naval technology. As can be seen in Table 3, this limitation is underway
in many important areas. The Navy is precluded from deploying naval ABM
systems by the 1972 ABM Treaty. (Deployment of a GPALS system might
ideally be deployed from naval assets in the future, but this requires more
detailed scientific and engineering research and a revisiting of the ABM
Treaty). The Navy is also adhering to cruise missile controls. As previously
mentioned, nuclear SLCM is limited by executive agreement in conjunction
with the START negotiations and conventional SLCM is being controlled,
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unilaterally, through the constraints of publicly announced Planned
Procurement Buys (PPB), monitored by the Cruise Missile Project Office
(CMPO). Navy SSBMs are now being unilaterally controlled via reduced
submarine procurement, as well as through SALT II limitations. The Navy
might also "take credit" for unilateral limitations in the emerging field of
stealth aircraft (making a virtue out of necessity), as a result of the
cancellation of the A-12 program. 103 Finally, significant ASW limitation is
happening via the major unilateral force cuts now underway (SSNs, ASW
capable surface ships, and ASW aircraft reduction) and formal treaty.104 Any
cut in the US fleet reduces ASW capability in a real way, since virtually all
air/sea assets are ASW capable through some combination of: sonar,
bathythermograph, radar, visual watch, etc.
The three categories of capability limitation (weapons of mass destruction,
total force structure, and naval technology) are currently in force, in reality,
even though it is not the practice of the U.S. government to describe many of
the unilateral measures in arms control terms. The reduction in total force
structure is obvious (nearly 100 total hulls). The only avenue to structural
naval arms control not being undertaken unilaterally is a limitation on total
resources allocated to the Navy (see Table 1). Although this avenue is
theoretically possible, it should never be considered because it is nonsensical
103Even though the program was not terminated for arms control reasons, it is a legitimate
unilateral action with arms control repercussions.
104ASW is also limited by the SALT Treaties through SSBN force level constraints.
While SSBNs are not designed as ASW platforms, they are capable of executing ASW
missions.
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to single out navy appropriations in this manner and to employ such an
arbitrary methodology in order to achieve the goals of arms control.
Test two calls for a residual force structure which, although smaller, is
highly mobile, in order that it be able to cover a wide range of requirements.
In a world growing ever smaller through technological breakthroughs in
transportation and communications, naval arms control which restricts
operational flexibility is simply counter-intuitive. It doesn't make sense to
accept any limitations upon the U.S. Navy's ability to freely use the seas for
whatever purposes it chooses, regardless of what it gets in return from other
navies (including acceptance of similar restrictions). This familiar argument
may be even more valid now, in an environment in which former
superpower "client" states sense relatively less "paternal restraint" and "adult
supervision", than they did during the Cold War. While some scholars may
object to the lack of empirical evidence or technical analysis to justify my
position, it is my contention that the underlying principle is so clear as to
make quantitative or rigorous analysis unnecessary and merely clouds the
issue. Nuclear free zones, ASW free zones, and SSBN safe havens represent
an arms control gratuity to all potential negotiating partners who are
incapable of competing in these respective avenues of naval warfare; they are
simultaneously a unilateral penalty to Western nations who have devoted
valuable resources to system procurement and personnel/ unit training
associated with these capabilities. While these proposals may appear
relatively more palatable than negotiated force structure cuts (because they
can theoretically be reversed quickly if the strategic situation demands), they
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are particularly unattractive in an environment which demands that naval
forces be as flexible and mobile as possible.
It is clear from Table 3, however, that several operational limits are
already in force. Naval exercises which involve projecting power ashore (i.e.
functionally-linked amphibious exercises) are accounted for by the Helsinki
and Stockholm Accords. The Navy should also make the case that the
unilateral reduction in naval exercises and peacetime naval deployments also
are worthy of "arms control credit". An expanded regime of exercise
notification or deployment limitation could provide enough intelligence to
jeopardize or preclude important real-world operations in the future,
launched under the cover of a planned exercise or deployment (e.g. a hostage
rescue, blockade, etc.). The marginal benefits which can be gained from
expanded exercise notification do not compensate for the potentially serious
sacrifice of capability, and this potential sacrifice renders these regimes
strategically unwise. There is no reason to expand exercise notification
beyond the Helsinki and Stockholm accords.
The Navy is also a player in so-called "zone" proposals. Even though it is
not often discussed, the Navy already participates in the observance of a zone
of peace (established by The Antarctic Treaty of 1959) and a nuclear weapons
free zone (established by The Latin America Nuclear-Free Zone Treaty of
1967).105 Proposals to create additional nuclear weapons free zones must not
be analyzed solely with respect to maritime considerations. Does it make
105The nomenclature of this treaty can be misleading. It establishes a nuclear weapons
free zone, not a nuclear free zone.
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sense to have nuclear weapons free zones at sea but no limit upon deployed
nuclear systems in the air? Clearly, the United States will have to reach
consensus upon the higher order questions of overall deterrence strategy and
force disposition before specific proposals, such as naval operational
restrictions, should be entertained. These proposals are strategically
premature, but could potentially be productive in the future. For instance, a
nuclear weapons free zone on the continent of Europe itself (not to include
adjacent bodies of water) could eventually be in the US interest and would
also increase the Navy's contribution to extended nuclear deterrence.
The debate over the new national security strategy must first address a
prioritization and characterization of the threats to the United States is in the
new world order. (Not even this basic first order question will be quickly
settled). Threat prioritization decisions will then logically lead to a re-
examination of US nuclear strategy and the NATO strategy of flexible
response. Entertaining the lower order question of the naval role in nuclear
deterrence prior to settling the higher order national and international
political questions is strategically inappropriate and potentially
counterproductive.
When analyzing the realm of naval CSBMs, a logical place to start, as is
the case with force structure questions, is with the control of nuclear
weapons. There are four CSBMs, currently in force, which make nuclear war
at sea less likely: The "Accidents Measures" Agreement of 1971, The Nuclear
Risk Reduction Centers Agreement of 1987, The Ballistic Missile Launch
Notification Agreement of 1988, and The Dangerous Military Activities
Agreement of 1989.
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Another avenue for naval nuclear deconfliction, depicted in Table 3, is
the adoption of common technological standards (e.g. PALS). The
justification for PALS, especially in an environment in which GPALS is being
pursued, is widely known. Once again, however, the US must not be seduced
into the belief that it can accomplish everything possible in arms control
immediately and simultaneously. Formally negotiating the PAL issue may
preclude it from ever being undertaken (even if it is deemed to be in the US
national interest) or may embroil it in an endless quagmire of arms control
skepticism, charges, and counter charges. A very unattractive possibility is a
demand by the Soviets to subject an agreement on PALS to on-site inspection
(as a quid pro quo for nuclear and conventional ground force on-site
inspections). It may be in the US interest, in the future, to adopt PALS
unilaterally and pressure the Soviets to do likewise. If a GPALS system is
destined to be deployed, however, the need to force PALS upon the Soviet
Union is less urgent. This is another issue which requires more study to
ascertain strategic value and costs and is definitely premature in an
environment in which first order political identity questions are unsettled.
The same logic holds with respect to a change in US declaratory policy
with respect to first use of nuclear weapons at sea. There is undoubtedly
political capital to be gained from such a stance, but it can only be analyzed in
context after US nuclear strategy and NATO nuclear strategy have been
modernized to conform to the new world order.
Table 3 also depicts my less enthusiastic assessment of the literature's
more "popular" naval CSBMs (those which attempt to strengthen politico-
military predictability). Three of the most often discussed possibilities are
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exercise notification, static data exchanges and naval doctrinal talks. The
arguments against constraining naval exercises in any way (to include prior
notification), beyond the requirements of the Helsinki and Stockholm
Accords have been mentioned above. Naval doctrinal talks may produce
some benefits but static data exchanges would be counterproductive at this
time.
In the case of naval doctrinal talks, it should first be noted that the
bilateral US-Soviet military doctrinal talks include the subject of navies, at
least from the perspective of the Soviets, who view naval forces as but one
component of formal military art (and one source for the development of
formal military science). Some writers on this subject ask, what would be
obtained from doctrinal talks which cannot be obtained in the open literature,
observed in deployment patterns and exercise behavior, or created through
personnel exchanges? The principal advantage of naval doctrinal talks is that
they would allow for the establishment of a common professional language
to exist between the two navies, and agreement upon common naval
terminology may be useful in the future when the two navies may be
politically directed to cooperate on more ambitious maritime tasks (I propose
two such ideas at the end of this section). Naval doctrinal talks could, for
example, serve as the medium to resolve the dispute concerning the validity
of the concept of naval operational art and mutual assured destruction
(MAD). Such discussions, while arguably of marginal benefit now, can serve
as the foundation for a new navy-to-navy relationship. A precondition for
such a doctrinal seminar, however (to be agreed upon privately), should be
that the not be used as a public relations forum to press the West on
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structural naval arms control issues. If such a prefacing understanding can be
obtained, there is no reason not to embark on naval doctrinal talks now.
Static data exchanges of a nation's naval order-of-battle should not be
pursued now, however. With current military restructuring being
undertaken by both the US and Soviet Union, why complicate the process by
trying to definitively track the status of various units whose future may not
be even decided by the cognizant national government for some time to
come. The uncertainty and skepticism which now surrounds the CFE process
is a testament to the potential seriousness of this problem. If the Soviet
government is battling internally over what its future force structure should
look like, how can the West expect to receive clear and accurate data now?
The trap in arms control policy is the desire to achieve every goal
immediately and simultaneously. Since we all agree that structural naval
arms control is happening, there is no need to jeopardize that process now,
for the sake of marginally useful data which is largely available through
intelligence channels (although admittedly in a less reliable and convenient
form). This measure, designed to build confidence, could actually erode
confidence if undertaken prematurely. (Consider, for example, the possibility
of charges by Western conservatives of Soviet attempts to pull off a "naval
Krasnoyarsk radar".) Static data exchanges of naval assets in inventory (and
those transferred/sold to other nations) should be reconsidered after post-
Cold War military restructuring is near completion in both countries, and if
other naval arms control avenues are yielding useful and desirable results.
Another naval CSBM in this functional area is the establishment of joint
naval crisis control procedures. Perhaps even a bilateral naval command
84
center could be constructed which, in conjunction with national command
centers, could prevent incidents like the collision which occurred between US
and Soviet warships in the Black Sea. The Navy already is a player in the
"Accidents Measures" Agreement of 1971, The Nuclear Risk Reduction
Centers Agreement of 1987, The Ballistic Missile Launch Notification
Agreement of 1988, and The Dangerous Military Activities Agreement of
1989, as well as the principal player in naval tactical deconfliction via the
Incidents at Sea Agreement (INCSEA) of 1972. The concept of "navy only"
crisis control centers may have potential and is certainly worthy of additional
study. Until the higher order political questions of SOVIET national identity
are settled, however, this idea is premature. Do we really want a joint crisis
control center which could gather intelligence and report to a post-Gorbachev
government run by the Soviet military and conservative civilians? This is
another prime candidate for a "wait and see "strategy.
CSBMs which foster the building of international relationships are
already succeeding as policy and should be expanded now to contribute to the
broad education of military officers, expanding upon the congressional
mandates of The Goldwater-Nichols Defense Reorganization Act. This is
definitely an avenue for arms control which has benefits which extend
beyond the confines of arms control itself and can be used to contribute
directly to national strategy (see strategy test four). The publicity which
resulted from OPERATION DESERT STORM gave the American people a
window into the mind of General Norman Schwarzkopf, USA
(USCINCCENT), a combination rough-and-tumble warrior and an articulate
strategic thinker. The public undoubtedly liked what they saw and will
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certainly expect the same caliber of enlightened leadership from their military
in the future. The Goldwater-Nichols Act was a congressional mandate that
U.S. military officers be more than just competent warriors and parochial
bureaucrats; the Congress and the public want military officers who are
statesmen and strategic thinkers with not only "joint" credentials, but
international savvy and experience.
Arms control (specifically, international confidence building measures)
can play a valuable role in the broad education of a warrior-statesman, a role
which cannot be accomplished by purely domestic institutions. Military-to-
military contacts, such as the 1989 exchanges and subsequent visits between
the U.S. National Defense University and the USSR's former Voroshilov
General Staff Academy, are immensely valuable in forging stronger
relationships between the respective military systems. Now is the time to
plan for the future relationship of the US and Soviet military by conducting
personnel exchanges not only at the senior officer level, but the junior officer
and midshipman level as well. Naval Academy midshipmen, who will need
the best possible understanding of their Soviet counterparts throughout their
entire careers, are of the ideal seniority and stationed at a prime location to
begin such exchanges. U.S. and Soviet Naval Academies would be excellent
settings for such meetings since the institutions are designed for education
and would not be prone to exposing military intelligence. Naval Academy
exchanges should provide for a full spectrum of cross-cultural sampling, to
include professional discussions, foreign language education, athletic
activities, and social functions.
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Why not also have junior officer exchanges between students at
postgraduate institutions and war colleges in conjunction with a broad
program of strategic studies and joint professional military education (JPME)?
While there would be some new logistical arrangements and security
procedures to work through, it may prove very interesting to have exchange
officers able to attend unclassified classes on government policy and naval
affairs. If the policy of the U.S. government is to bring the Soviet Union into
the community of nations, then Soviet participation in existing multilateral
exchange programs is called for. These exchange programs could be designed
to allow exchange officers to conduct bilateral /multilateral research and
publish their findings in professional journals such as the U.S. Naval
Institute Proceedings, as a precursor to journal exchanges authored by naval
flag officers and navy strategists. Additionally, junior officer exchanges could
test the value of conducting joint wargames (if the games are well designed
and executed) to see if the idea is worth pursuing at the senior officer level.
When junior officers (who have been exposed to these experiences) reach
command rank, they will have nearly twenty years of experience in dealing
with issues from a broader international perspective than is possible through
mere policy indoctrination. This experience and the personal contacts which
can evolve from these exchanges may be invaluable to the nation during
times of crisis or potential windows of international opportunity.
These exchanges carry the added benefit of fostering the sentiment that
the U.S. Navy is a worldly and progressive organization, and is in the
vanguard of desirable change. This perception will not only enhance the US
national interest, it will also be transformed into valuable political capital for
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the Navy in future budget allocation decisions. These strong
recommendations, designated in Table 3, can have real national impact,
rather than policies which simply perpetuate or stonewall the process.
Neither of these reactive extremes will be valuable perspectives in the new
world order.
Test six of the new strategy reflects increasing public awareness that has
been devoted to environmental issues in recent years. Four major
environmental incidents over the last five years should be considered by
strategic planners:
• The 1986 Soviet nuclear accident at Chernobyl
• The Exxon Valdez oil spill
• Kuwaiti oil well fires, set by Iraq, in the last days of the Persian Gulf
War
• Iraq's intentional oil spill in the Persian Gulf
The Chernobyl incident not only renewed concerns over nuclear energy,
it also focused public attention on the dangers of all hazardous substances.
The Exxon Valdez oil spill unleashed unprecedented damage upon the
environment, cost over one billion dollars to settle106 , and raised difficult
questions regarding national preparedness for such emergencies. The
environmental terrorism unleashed by Iraq during the Persian Gulf War
served notice that the world community must possess environmental
protection capability and political response mechanisms which are designed
to meet potential, deliberate environmental terrorism, not just unintentional
incidents. This assumption is analogous in its magnitude to basing military
106ABC World News Tonight, March 13, 1991.
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procurement programming on the most dangerous military threat (e.g. the
Soviet Union) rather than more likely lesser threats. The US Navy should
actively support programs which place it in the role of "environmental
watchdog", without compromising its warfighting capability.
The Navy has already instituted an aggressive program to control the
dumping of toxic waste and non-biodegradable substances at sea and plays in
The Environmental Modification Convention of 1977. Now is the time,
however, to staff out the idea of navy-to-navy procedures for containing
maritime environmental accidents/environmental terrorism (e.g. oil spills,
nuclear weapons accidents, etc.). "Arms control" for environmental
protection may very well be at the ground floor stage of a potentially booming
field of international policy and, unlike many arms control discussions of the
past, focuses upon an area of concern which the public genuinely cares about
and deems worthy of increased attention. It would be prudent to agree upon
common signals (such as those in INCSEA), designate a specific radio
frequency for command and control of environmental incident response, and
to formulate specific procedures for the designation of the on-scene-
commander (OSC), tasking of clean-up assets, etc. This agreement should
ultimately be expanded to be multilateral in scope, philosophically, since the
environment is of international concern and practically, because U.S. and
Soviet ships will not always be on scene first (or even present at all).
Another new avenue for naval agreements is the field of
bilateral/multilateral humanitarian relief procedures (see Table 3). Valuable
lessons can be learned from the effort to provide relief to Kurdish refugees in
the aftermath of the Persian Gulf War. The Congress and the American
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people made it clear to the Administration that in this age of instant
worldwide communication and rapid transport capability, there is no excuse
for failing to provide humanitarian aide to those in need, regardless of
natural obstacles, man-made borders of state, or bureaucratic charter (test
seven). Under the new strategy, the US will need to at least maintain, and
most probably enhance, its capability to rapidly and successfully deliver
humanitarian assistance wherever required. This is another inevitable test of
the new strategy which can be bolstered by confidence building arms control.
The US would be wise to enter into military-to-military discussions with the
Soviet Union (in which navies take the lead) on communication and
coordination procedures to execute expanded joint humanitarian operations
(e.g. the delivery of supplies to refugees and/or accident victims in littoral
regions). The issue is such an important one in the public perception that it
demands attention now. It should be emphasized that navy-to-navy
procedures for environmental protection and humanitarian relief efforts
sacrifice absolutely nothing; unilateral operations can and should be
undertaken in situations which are better managed unilaterally, for any
reason
—
political or logistic. These agreements can, however, provide the US
government with additional tools to employ if and when they may be
necessary and productive.
It should be remembered that the Navy, as an institution, was way ahead
of the nation's "war on drugs" campaign by instituting the aggressive
urinalysis program which has served as a model for many other institutions
within government and the civilian sector. The Navy shouldn't be afraid get
out in front again, not only in domestic confidence building measures (e.g.
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the Navy's zero tolerance drug policy) but by actively exploring the new
avenues for international confidence building measures described here.
Creative CSBMs, like those discussed above, are worth exploring further since
they could facilitate the goals of arms control by reducing the likelihood of
war, serve the recognized needs of the international community, and
simultaneously bolster U.S. credibility as the world's fulcrum actor and only
fully functional superpower. The Navy should not, however, recommend
the adoption of any naval arms control regime (even benign CSBMs) solely to
increase domestic political capital. If potential agreements are detrimental to
US national security interests, the Navy has a responsibility to the
government and citizenry to forcefully articulate such findings. That
determination, however, can only be intelligently made after analysis of
"new" CSBM ideas is complete. The key point is that the new environment
demands more creativity and flexibility and less linkage to Cold War
precedents.
A summary of my conclusions and recommendations, as deduced from
Table 3, yield several key observations of potential interest to policy makers:
1. THE UNITED STATES IS ALREADY A MAJOR PLAYER IN NAVAL
ARMS CONTROL. OUT OF 31 DISTINCT AVENUES FOR THE
LIMITATION OF NAVAL FORCES, THE NAVY PARTICIPATES IN 14
BY NEGOTIATED TREATY, 3 BY EXECUTIVE AGREEMENT, AND 12
BY UNILATERAL ACTION (these are conservative figures—they don't
reflect the fact that many avenues are governed by more than one
treaty, agreement, and/or unilateral action). THE NAVY IS NOT
"JUST SAYING NO", IT IS CONSTRUCTIVELY PARTICIPATING IN
THE STRATEGICALLY SENSIBLE AVENUES OF NAVAL ARMS
CONTROL.
2. There are no naval arms control regimes on the horizon which are
appropriate to pursue via negotiated treaty. I recommend six naval
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CSBMs be pursued now (by executive agreement) and that six others be
revisited, when the structure of the new world order is more clear.
3. THERE ARE FOUR MAIN AVENUES THAT THE US MUST AVOID,
AND THESE FOUR AVENUES ARE NOT ONLY STRATEGICALLY
UNACCEPTABLE, THEY ARE ALSO THE MOST DIFFICULT TO
OPERATIONALIZE AND VERIFY (limitation of naval resources,
nuclear free zones, ASW free zones, and SSBN safe havens).
4. Limitations of naval capability—now affecting both the US and Soviet
navies as a result of unilateral budget action—should not be interfered
with and jeopardized through the "arsenal balance" model of
negotiated arms control.
5. Operational restrictions are even less attractive in light of the new
national security strategy than they were in the Cold War. These
measures are unacceptable.
6. "Popular" CSBMs (e.g. static data exchanges, a no first use of nuclear
weapons declaration, bilateral/multilateral naval crisis control centers,
and PALS) are strategically premature for the current arms control
agenda. They need to be researched further and await the "settling out"
of the post-Cold War international paradigm.
7. Relationship building CSBMs (e.g. personnel exchanges,
bilateral/multilateral wargaming, journal exchanges, etc.) should be
aggressively pursued and expanded to the midshipman/junior officer
level because such measures support the US interest, regardless of the
identity of the emerging world order. These measures involve little
risk since they can be easily "turned off" should there be significant
strains in the future US-Soviet relationship.
8 The most exciting possibilities are new CSBMs, introduced in this
thesis, for procedures which facilitate naval contributions to critical
international priorities. These possibilities reach beyond Cold War
precedents for naval arms control and into the realms of
environmental protection and humanitarian relief .
The new contribution of this thesis is that through its recommended
agenda, arms control can be steered onto an entirely new course; agreements
can now be fashioned to tackle problems of real public concern, interest, and
passion. During the Cold War, The American public generally trusted the
government bureaucracy to negotiate arms control agreements with the
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Soviet Union which supported the national interest and simultaneously
appeared socially progressive. The public could rarely understand, however,
the obscure field of "balancing asymmetries", and if it was occasionally
understood, it did not inspire anyone at all, whether they be arms control
experts or private citizens.
A continuation of this dynamic is ultimately not in the national interest.
With unilateral structural arms control in force as a result of the demise of
the Cold War paradigm, the US government has the historic opportunity to
use arms control pro-actively to foster US national interests by becoming
engaged in critical international priorities which will not only benefit the
world community, but will also engender long term support for the US
military in the post-containment era. Naval arms control can be turned away
from the undesirable course of historical precedent (a course that no one but
Soviet Cold Warriors wanted) and instead be creatively channelled to solve
problems that matter in both war and peace—and specifically for purposes
that the Clausewitzian social structure cares about, understands and supports.
This new dynamic is ultimately in the US national interest. This
transformation could ultimately reverse the limited value of arms control,
both actual and perceived. The goal of making arms control more significant,
valuable, and useful as a pro-active tool presents a window of opportunity
which should be seized now.
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V. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
A. BACKGROUND
A plethora of literature was authored during the Cold War which
analyzed every aspect of traditional naval arms control alternatives, namely:
limitations on capability and force structure, limitations on operations, and
confidence and security building measures (CSBMs). The vast majority of the
literature, while contributing to the body of knowledge on specific proposals,
analyzed naval arms control in a purely maritime vacuum, rather than
reframing the question in a coherent national strategic context. In my
opinion, naval arms control is a FIFTH ORDER QUESTION which logically
awaits the fleshing out of the more fundamental strategic choices which
precede it in a top-down, hierarchical cognitive depiction of national strategic
policy.
The changes which have taken place in the Soviet Union are of such
fundamental importance that they require the United States to re-appraise all
of the strategic planning assumptions which characterized the Cold War. The
United States must first forge a consensus post-Cold War identity (the first
order question) before the specific mechanisms of statesmanship are
appropriate to consider. Secondly, the United States must prioritize the
threats which it faces in the post-Cold War world and make the critical choice
between unilateral military superiority against anticipated military threats or
size its force to prevail only in conjunction with likely coalition allies, against
possible adversaries (the second order question).
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The third order question demands that a coherent synthesis be fused from
the three distinct types of military strategy: planning strategy, programming
strategy, and warfighting strategy. The planning strategy must serve to
connect the declaratory warfighting strategy (which may not be the real
warfighting strategy) with a supporting procurement philosophy. Although
this third order process may be illusory, some form of connecting justification
(even a paper strategy of facade) is necessary for bureaucratic continuity. For
example, the US national command authorities may have had no intention
of ever executing the Maritime Strategy, however it was very useful as the
foundation for programming. (As a declaratory warfighting strategy, it
required the procurement of additional forces in order to accomplish its
mission objectives.) In this case, national programming strategy was based
upon a declaratory warfighting strategy which was arguably real.
The fourth order question requires that the Navy's role, relative to the
other services, be articulated in the context of national planning,
programming, and warfighting strategies. Each of these "questions" are
actually lengthy processes for the entire executive branch of government.
Until each of these processes (based upon a world order which no one has yet
seen) yield consensus thinking, fifth order questions, like what type of arms
control regimes support US national security interests, are cognitively
premature. What can be clearly seen now, however, is that a military
establishment designed solely as an instrument to be used in a global, zero-
sum game competition with the Soviet Union is no longer viable.
The changes which have recently transformed the international strategic
environment are undoubtedly real and they permeate every issue of
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international relations, national strategic management, and politico-military
strategic planning. American strategy must be based upon the realization that
the world has undergone a dramatic revolution, not merely an incremental
evolution or short term aberration, regardless of the ultimate destiny of the
identity crisis currently wrenching the Soviet Union. The politico-military
planning process is in a phase which is analogous (in magnitude if not
substance) to the era in which the post-World War II Containment Strategy
was born. This time, however, the challenge is more difficult—both
intellectually and practically—because the luxury of simply planning to
counter the designs of a universally distrusted and unpopular aggressor
nation is no longer viable.
There are three approaches that can be used to begin the process of
strategic planning:
• Identification of goals and objectives
• Preparation to counter a specific threat (or threats) •
• Determination of resource availability
The Cold War paradigm was dominated by strategic planning based upon
the Communist threat as embodied by the Soviet Union. The starting point
for strategic planning in the post-Cold War world can no longer be "the
threat" since the Cold War, at least as we knew it, has been won (even with
the realization that the Soviet Union remains the only nation militarily
capable of destroying American society). Strategic planning will be dominated
by resource availability constraints for the foreseeable future, however
planning based upon resource availability will need to be justified by the
articulated goals and objectives of the United States in the new world order.
The United States will have to present a credible plan for what it wants to
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accomplish in the world, rather than how it should prevent the Soviet Union
from accomplishing its international agenda. With the demise of the Cold
War paradigm, the American public clearly is no longer willing to accept the
opportunity costs associated with Cold War defense expenditures.
In order to meet the requirements of a new national security
environment, the Bush administration presented a plan to Congress to
restructure the US defense establishment (announced via the President's
speech to the Aspen Institute Symposium on August 2, 1990). The primary
objective of the strategy is to justify the reductions in defense spending which
are required to meet consensus domestic spending priorities and to respond
credibly to Soviet defense spending cuts and geo-strategic concessions.
Although President Bush's plan will be reviewed and modified by Congress,
the basic target of the plan, a 25% reduction in military expenditures and
personnel end strength, is likely to occur.
Future naval arms control regimes will need to be analyzed not in the
context of the Cold War strategies and literature, but instead upon the new
national security strategy now being presented to Congress. This thesis is the
first work which uses the assumptions of the new national security as a
strategic backdrop for the analysis of naval arms control alternatives. The
recommendations reached in this thesis, however, were derived from the
realization that the new national security strategy may take a different shape
as a result of congressional action, if trends in the Soviet Union change
significantly, or if the CFE Treaty is not ratified (a key requirement for
adoption of a new strategy, as articulated recently be General Powell).
Additionally, this thesis postulates a set of probable congressional tests of the
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new strategy which also are important considerations upon which to base
naval arms control policy, namely: the adequate and responsible addressing of
domestic resource constraints; the provision of a residual military force
which is highly flexible and mobile; the formulation of a weapons of mass
destruction policy which is responsive to public concern and the new geo-
strategic realities; the encouragement of joint qualified officers; and the
enhancement of the military's role in environmental protection and
humanitarian relief efforts.
B. WHY THE US GOVERNMENT DESERVES BETTER MARKS ON
NAVAL ARMS CONTROL
Analysis of a current status "snapshot" of naval arms control reveals that
the navy is not "just saying no"; it is a major player in every principal avenue
of maritime arms control (i.e. capability limitations, operational limitations,
and CSBMs). In the case of capability limitation, the primary difference
between this period and the Cold War is that both navies are now undergoing
simultaneous, unilateral structural arms control. This process is facilitating
the goals of arms control (reducing the risks of war, the consequences of war,
and the resources devoted to national defense) and should therefore not be
jeopardized by exposing it to the rigors, uncertainties, and risks of formal,
legally binding international treaties.
The Navy needs to make an even stronger case in its position concerning
a specific subset of naval capability—weapons of mass destruction. The Navy
does not possess, test, or exercise with any chemical or biological weapon and
is eliminating most tactical nuclear weapons, unilaterally, without the
interference of a treaty. Additionally, the Navy's nuclear SLCMs are being
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controlled via executive agreement and unilateral measures. The Navy can
also "take credit" for participation in efforts to forestall nuclear proliferation
in the world's oceans (The Seabed Arms Control Treaty of 1971) and for the
limitation of nuclear testing (The Limited Test Ban Treaty of 1963).
Although rarely mentioned, key naval technologies are also being
controlled. These technologies include: naval application of ABM systems,
naval cruise missiles (nuclear and conventional), SLBMs, stealth aircraft, and
strategic ASW.
When operational limitations are considered, it is not often emphasized
that in addition to the Navy being governed by restrictions of functionally
linked amphibious naval exercises (The Helsinki and Stockholm Accords), it
is unilaterally reducing peacetime naval deployments and already participates
in the observance of a zone of peace (established by The Antarctic Treaty of
1959) and a nuclear weapons free zone (established by The Latin America
Nuclear-Free Zone Treaty of 1967).
Additionally, the Navy is also a principal advocate of many CSBMs,
including the agreements which make the use of nuclear weapons at sea less
likely: The "Accidents Measures" Agreement of 1971, The Nuclear Risk
Reduction Centers Agreement of 1987, The Ballistic Missile Launch
Notification Agreement of 1988, and The Dangerous Military Activities
Agreement of 1989. Naval forces also bolster international confidence and
security via the INCSEA Agreement of 1972, and an expanding regime of
personnel exchanges.
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C RECOMMENDED NAVAL ARMS CONTROL INITIATIVES
In conjunction with articulating the often understated participation of the
US Navy in naval arms control matters, the Navy would be wise to enhance
its domestic political credibility by coming forth with naval arms control
initiatives, developed in-house (rather than being mandated by congress) that
could contribute to US national security posture. The inescapable reality is
that institutions which lose domestic political credibility will become
irrelevant during the policy formulation process, a process which will surely
be dominated by an increasingly introspective national agenda for the
foreseeable future. An institution perceived as bureaucratically irrelevant
and out-of-step will be a sure loser in the resource allocation game, regardless
of the intellectual purity of its positions or successful track-record of the past.
The Navy should not allow itself to become a spectator while Congress and
OSD debate its future.
Although naval arms control is a fifth order question which requires that
consensus be determined first for the previous four, it is entirely appropriate
to staff out regimes, especially in the CSBM area, which would be beneficial in
any emerging environment. One CSBM initiative which makes sense within
this construct is an expansion of personnel exchanges to the junior
officer/midshipman level. Now is the time to prepare for a more cooperative
future relationship between the US and Soviet Union by fostering military
ties which will be useful to each nation throughout the entire careers and
lives of the exchange participants. Exchanges between postgraduate school
and war college students would expand the goal of a broad strategic education
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to an even higher and more useful plane than mere "jointness";
international sophistication and cultural sensitivity can become core
elements in the education of mid-grade and senior naval officers. These
exchanges should also be used as a testing ground for journal exchanges,
doctrinal seminars, wargaming, etc. to "work the bugs out" of each procedure
before they are implemented in senior officer exchanges.
This thesis introduces two new initiatives for naval arms control:
bilateral agreements between the US and Soviet Navies which would
establish procedures for environmental protection and humanitarian relief
efforts in maritime theaters. Recent environmental disasters (including the
1986 Chernobyl nuclear accident, the Exxon Valdez oil spill, and the various
Iraqi acts of environmental terrorism during the Persian Gulf War) have
emphasized the need for increased international attention on this issue, and
the issue has become even more important domestically, in the American
political psyche. Likewise, the plight of the Kurdish refugees in the aftermath
of the Persian Gulf War brought increased public attention to the problem of
humanitarian suffering throughout the world.
It is imperative that the United States government seize the opportunity
now to steer the naval arms control agenda away from the traditionally
uninspiring, marginally useful, and highly problematic avenues of the Cold
War and instead channel those efforts into priorities which really matter to
the citizens of the two nations A major problem with Cold War arms control
was that the process became self perpetuating and was largely irrelevant in
the greater scheme of international relations and domestic opinion. The
proposed agreements on environmental protection and humanitarian relief
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have a real chance of contributing to efforts which legitimately bring the two
nations closer together, and that would serve to satisfy the goals of arms
control much more directly and significantly than a theoretical acceptance of
mutual definitions for "balancing asymmetries" between our two naval
arsenals. Those international arms control technicians who want to
continually wrestle with questions of naval order-of-battle calculus are clearly
out-of-step with the new strategic environment in which we must operate.
There are some regimes which may be of interest and may be useful in
the future, but unlike the ideas discussed above, are strategically and
mechanically premature to consider until consensus is reached on each of the
four higher order questions of US defense policy. This argument is germaine
to the subject of a no-first use of nuclear weapons declaration, static data
exchanges, bilateral /multilateral naval crisis control centers, and adoption of
PALS. Until the national identities of the US and USSR in the new world
order are clarified (and until the respective supporting nuclear and
conventional strategies are derived and analyzed), complex fifth order arms
control initiatives which can not be easily "turned off" are not appropriate.
D. NAVAL ARMS CONTROL WHICH MUST BE AVOIDED
The new world order requires that the US maintain a potent naval force
which is even more flexible and mobile than in the past. For this reason,
naval arms control through operational limitation is even more detrimental
to US interests than it was during the Cold War and should be completely
avoided (e.g. exercise notification, nuclear free zones, ASW free zones, SSBN
safe havens, etc). In an era of both fewer naval platforms and more diverse
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and lethal threats to US interests, any operational limitation beyond the
Helsinki and Stockholm Accords is simply counter-intuitive.
The US should avoid any regime which cannot be easily discontinued or
amended, since the international environment (especially the future
prospects of the Soviet Union) remains so tenuous. The US should also
refrain from pursuing any arms control regime via negotiated treaty. If we
have learned our lessons from the Cold War, post-Cold War arms control
should be conducted unilaterally, if possible, and by executive agreement, if
necessary.
The US Navy should be pro-active in recommending naval CSBMs
which support our national goals but must also strongly state the case that we
are already fully engaged participants in a naval arms control process and will
not support future regimes merely for the sake of political expediency. It is
also imperative that the White House continues to state its refusal to
negotiate naval force levels or naval operational limitations. A real and
sustained continuation of this commitment in the new strategic
environment removes the specter of a "slippery slope" to more deleterious
forms of naval arms control. Commitment to a consistent national "bottom
line" will free the Navy to become pro-active in the CSBM area without
having to hedge its bets; CSBMs cannot then cascade down the "slippery
slope" to detrimental structural and operational arms control avenues.
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